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Color-blind Racism in France: Bias Against Ethnic 
Minority Immigrants  
Leland Ware

 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigration from former colonies in North and sub-Saharan 
Africa has had a significant effect on France’s demographic 
composition. That nation now has the largest Muslim population in 
Europe and conflicts involving ethnic minority populations have 
increased dramatically. In 2004, the French parliament adopted a law 
prohibiting female students from wearing headscarves in public 
schools. In 2010, a law was passed that prohibits women from 
wearing face-covering veils in public places. Both measures have 
been highly controversial. Many Muslim women interpret their 
religion to require scarves and veils in public. France’s anti-veil laws 
have, at minimum, a discriminatory effect on Muslim women based 
on their ethnicity, religion, color, and national origin.  
The French veil laws would not be permitted in America, as they 
would violate American antidiscrimination laws and the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which protects the free 
exercise of religion. The French justify the veil law with the doctrine 
of laïcité (“secularism”), which prohibits the display of conspicuous 
religious symbols in public places. The laws are also grounded in 
principles of French Republicanism, which discourage the assertion 
of separate ethnic identities. Social integration for immigrants is 
conditioned on assimilation and a renunciation of an individual’s 
origins, faith, and customs.  
 
  Leland Ware, Louis L. Redding Chair and Professor of Law & Public Policy, 
University of Delaware. The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Adrien 
Wing, University of Iowa College of Law, for her invaluable assistance with his research in 
France and the attendees of the 2014 Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship 
Conference at Indiana Tech Law School in Fort Wayne, Indiana, for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this Article.  
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The effects of discriminatory practices are not limited to Muslim 
women. A large proportion of France’s “visible minorities” are 
segregated into public housing complexes in the suburban 
communities, known as banlieues (suburbs that surround French 
cities). The banlieues are geographically isolated and ethnically 
distinct from the surrounding communities. Many public housing 
complexes in the banlieues are neglected and physically 
deteriorating. Poverty, substandard schools, low-levels of educational 
attainment, crime, and unemployment are common features of these 
neighborhoods. 
Young banlieusards (banlieue residents) are stereotyped as gang 
members, criminals, and potential terrorists. They are otherized as 
“immigrants” even though many of them are second and third 
generation citizens born in France. Banlieusards are routinely 
targeted by police who abuse and harass them using the pretext of 
identity checks. These discriminatory practices treat the young men 
as second-class citizens and impinge on their rights to freedoms of 
movement and privacy. Police brutality inflicted on banlieusards 
provoked large-scale riots in 1983, the 1990s, and 2005.  
Racial and ethnic categories are not officially recognized in 
France. The French census does not disaggregate data by race or 
ethnicity, because French laws prohibit officials from doing so. 
France is officially color-blind. A similar form of color-blind 
policymaking has become the ideology to which most American 
whites subscribe. They acknowledge that there remains some 
discrimination against African Americans and other minorities, but it 
is not as severe as it was in in the past and is no longer an obstacle to 
minority progress. Many American whites view conditions in 
impoverished, inner city communities as a cultural phenomenon 
resulting from dysfunctional families, a lack of values, and a poor 
work ethic. Lingering vestiges of Jim Crow, such as all black schools 
in segregated neighborhoods, are believed to result from the private 
choices of individuals rather than discrimination in America’s 
housing markets. Scholars have labeled these attitudes “color-blind 
racism” because African Americans, Latinos, and other racial 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/11
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minorities still suffer from significant levels of discrimination that is 
masked by race-neutral justifications.
1
  
This Article will show that France’s race-neutral policies do not 
prevent the bias and discrimination caused by “color-blind racism.” It 
examines laws, policies, and practices that disadvantage ethnic 
minorities in France. Part I examines migration from former French 
colonies in Northern and sub-Saharan Africa. Part II analyzes the 
impact of Orientalist stereotypes on the development of immigration 
policies. Part III discusses the negative reaction to the growth of 
France’s ethnic minority population. Part IV explores the causes and 
effects of segregation in the suburban communities that surround 
French cities. Part V examines the causes of riots that erupted in the 
banlieues. Part VI examines the efficacy of French anti-
discrimination laws. Part VII explores the “ethnic penalty,” which 
denotes employment discrimination against ethnic minorities. Part 
VIII discusses the academic achievement problems of children from 
immigrant families. Part IX traces the development of the headscarf 
and burqa bans. Part X analyzes religious dress under American 
Constitutional law. The final section, Part XI, examines the veil 
controversies that have generated heated debates at national and 
international levels.  
An expanding body of literature is focusing on the veil debates in 
France. This Article puts those debates in a broader context by 
analyzing immigration policies; the effects of discrimination in 
housing, employment, and education; and the influence of 
internalized stereotypes. Race and ethnicity are important but largely 
unacknowledged aspects of the immigration debate among French 
officials who contend that race does not exist in France. However, the 
term “immigrant” has become a shorthand reference to ethnic 
minorities who are harshly criticized for failing to assimilate French 
values and traditions. This is particularly so in the case of Muslims, 
as many consider Islam to be incompatible with French values. 
Ethnic minorities are treated as permanent étrangeres (“strangers”) 
unworthy of acceptance by the majority population. The problem is 
 
 1. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND 
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (2003) (discussing color-
blind racism in the United States).  
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not that North and sub-Saharan Africans refuse to integrate into 
French society—the reality is France won’t allow them to do so.  
I. ETHNIC MINORITY IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE  
France has a long history of immigration. In the nineteenth 
century, during the height of the industrial revolution, France 
experienced severe labor shortages.
2
 The first North African migrant 
workers came to France in 1871.
3
 By 1911, three thousand North 
Africans worked in France.
4
 That number rose to thirty thousand in 
the years before World War I.
5
 During World War I, France enlisted 
over five-hundred thousand sub-Saharan and North African troops in 
the armed forces, and more than two-hundred thousand colonial 
workers from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Mali.
6
 During 
World War II, eighty thousand North and sub-Saharan African troops 
fought for France against Germany.
7
 After the war, Algerians were 
awarded French citizenship.
8
  
French perceptions of the North Africans that joined French 
society as laborers and soldiers are rooted in Orientalism, the 
country’s colonial past, and the independence movements of France’s 
former colonies.
9
 The expansion of France into Africa and Asia in the 
nineteenth century was justified on the grounds of mission 
civilisatrice (“civilizing mission”), which was aimed at educating less 
 
 2. ALEX G. HARGREAVES, MULTI-ETHNIC FRANCE: IMMIGRATION, POLITICS, CULTURE 
AND SOCIETY 16 (2d ed. 2007); Kimberly Hamilton, Patrick Simon & Clara Veniard, The 
Challenge of French Diversity (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ 
challenge-french-diversity [hereinafter The Challenge]; Shane Cooke, France for the French: A 
History of French Immigration Policy, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=idvK6r97ZIg. 
 3. Cathy Lisa Schneider, Police Power and Race Riots in Paris, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 133, 
141 (2008). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Quentin Duroy, North African Identity and Racial Discrimination in France: A Social 
Economic Analysis of Capability Deprivation, 69 REV. SOC. ECON. 307, 315 (2011). 
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civilized people in the far reaches of the world.
10
 The colonialist 
rhetoric promoting the civilizing mission appealed to national pride, 
the glory of French civilization, and the superiority of Christianity 
over Islam. Jules Ferry, the influential Minister for Public Instruction 
in the late nineteenth century, was a prominent proponent of the 
civilizing missions. In a speech made to the French Chamber of 
Deputies, he said, 
Gentlemen, we must speak more loudly and more honestly! 
We must say openly that indeed the higher races have a right 
over the lower races . . . I repeat, that the superior races have a 
right because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize 
the inferior races . . . .
11
 
The colonial society established by the French in Africa created two 
distinct communities: a superior caste consisting of French settlers 
and an inferior one consisting of Africans.
12
 One of the underlying 
assumptions of the republican model is that immigrants should not be 
culturally different from white French citizens as they gain 
citizenship.
13
 One of the elements of the assimilation strategy 
consisted of encouraging Muslim women to stop wearing 
headscarves.
14
 The republican model is premised on a concept of 
citizenship that rejects the notion of individual difference based on 
religion, ethnicity, or race. Assimilation of colonial subjects required 
indigenous populations to abandon their origins, faith, customs, and 
languages.
15
 The cultural norms advocated by the republican model 
 
 10. Id.; Ellen Wiles, Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: 
Implications of the French Ban for Interpretations of Equality, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 699, 704 
(2007). 
 11. Paul Halsall, Jules Ferry (1832–1893): On French Colonial Expansion, MODERN 
HISTORY SOURCEBOOK (July 1998), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1884ferry.asp. 
 12. Duroy, supra note 9, at 315–16. 
 13. Id. at 316; Gary Wilder, Panafricanism and the Republican Political Sphere, in THE 
COLOR OF LIBERTY: HISTORIES OF RACE IN FRANCE 237, 245 (Sue Peabody & Tyler Stovall 
eds., 2003); see generally ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1957) 
(examined the adverse psychological effects of colonialism on indigenous populations and 
European colonials) 
 14. Wiles, supra note 10, at 702.  
 15. Duroy, supra note 9, at 316. 
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consisted of a combination of French language, values, and 
traditions.
16
  
Prior to World War II, non-Europeans were a small proportion of 
France’s foreign-born population.17 North Africans moved to France 
where they worked for a few years and then returned home. When 
they returned they were often replaced by a friend or relative from the 
same village establishing what became known as the “rotation” 
system.
18
 This changed dramatically after World War II. When the 
war ended in 1945, the French government capitalized on cheap 
immigrant labor to reconstruct infrastructure damaged or destroyed 
during the conflict.
19
 France enacted immigration policies that were 
designed to facilitate the reconstruction of the economy and increase 
population growth.
20
 The National Office of Immigration (“ONI”) 
was created and began authorizing three different types of residence 
permits: temporary, ordinary, and privileged.
21
 Ethnic quotas were 
not included in a 1945 immigration ordinance, but ONI encouraged 
European immigration and discouraged African and Asian 
migrants.
22
 Despite these efforts, the fastest growing immigrant 
populations in France came from the “Maghreb,” the western part of 
North Africa, consisting of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
23
 The 
Maghrebi population grew from 2 percent of France’s foreign 
population in 1946 to 39 percent in 1982, which made this group the 
fastest growing immigrant population.
24
 The primary "pull" factor for 
these immigrants was the opportunity for economic advancement 
through employment in construction and factories in France.
25
 In the 
mid-1950s, France experienced another labor shortage.
26
 This led to a 
dramatic increase in immigrant communities in the 1960s.
27
  
 
 16.  Id. 
 17. HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 17.  
 18. Id. at 23. 
 19. Id. at 19. 
 20. Id. at 20; The Challenge, supra note 2.  
 21. Id. at 19–20; see also The Challenge, supra note 2.  
 22. The Challenge, supra note 2; HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 20.” 
 23. HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 20 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.; Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional 
Discrimination in the United States and Britain, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89 (2007). 
 26. HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 20.  
 27. Eloisa Vladescu, The Assimilation of Immigrant Groups in France—Myth or Reality?, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/11
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The independence movements in French colonies also 
significantly affected the nation’s demographics. Independence was 
granted to French Indochina in 1954 and to French colonies in West 
and Central Africa in 1960.
28
 In 1956, France granted independence 
to Morocco and Tunisia, leaving Algeria as its only colony in the 
Maghreb.
29
  
During Algeria’s colonization, almost one million white persons 
of French descent resided there. Under President Charles de Gaulle 
the government granted Algeria independence in 1958. Some of the 
pied noirs (“black foot” French citizens of European descent who 
lived in Algeria) created the Organisation d’Armée Secrète (“OAS”) 
to fight against independence.
30
 They wanted Algeria to retain its 
status as a French colony. The organization mounted an often violent, 
but ultimately unsuccessful campaign against the French government 
that included assassination attempts against President de Gaulle.
31
 
After OAS dissolved, Algerians continued to fight against the 
remaining French settlers.
32
 After a massacre that killed more than 
three thousand French settlers, the majority of those remaining 
returned to France.
33
 In 1962, Algeria was finally granted 
independence.
34
 By the 1980s, Maghrebis represented approximately 
 
5 JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES 1, 4 (2006), available at http://www6. 
miami.edu/eucenter/VladescuWP%20French%20Immigration.pdf. 
 28. DAVID BIRMINGHAM, THE DECOLONIZATION OF AFRICA 1 (David Birmingham ed., 
Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009) (1995), available at http://endbayeh.files.wordpress.com/ 
2011/11/ebooksclub-org__the_decolonization_of_africa3.pdf. 
 29. BIRMINGHAM, supra note 28, at 12. 
 30. MATTHEW CONNELLY, A DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION: ALGERIA’S FIGHT FOR 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 3–4 (2003); ALISTAR HORNE, 
A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954–1962 480 (2006). 
 31. CONNELLY, supra note 30, at 3–4.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Jim House, The colonial and post-colonial dimensions of Algerian migration to 
France, History in Focus, Migration, UNIV. LONDON INST. HISTORICAL RESEARCH: HISTORY 
IN FOCUS (Autumn, 2006), available at http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/articles/ 
house.html; see also Igor Film & Casbah Film, The Battle of Algiers, YOUTUBE (1966), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XeMWdueGTZ4 (portraying the events that occurred in 
Algeria’s capital city between November 1954 and December 1957 during the Algerian War of 
Independence).  
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30 percent of France’s total immigrant population, making them the 
largest non-European minority in France.
35
 
II. ORIENTALISM AND IMMIGRATION  
French attitudes about Maghrebian immigrants are rooted in 
Orientalist stereotypes. In The Politics of the Veil, Joan Wallach Scott 
examined French racism and explained how this racism informs 
French attitudes about immigrants.
36
 These attitudes are derived from 
colonialist traditions and “Orientalism”: ideological biases about 
cultures in regions designated by Europeans as the Orient.
37
 The term 
“Oriental” in this context denotes generalizations and stereotypes that 
cross many cultural and national boundaries.
38
 It essentializes a 
prototypical Oriental as one who is biologically inferior, exotic, and 
culturally backward.
39
 A major component of French culture is the 
conviction that its culture is superior to those of all non-Europeans. In 
what many consider to be the canonical text, Orientalism, Edward W. 
Said argued that since the beginning of Western civilization, 
 
 35. France still retains some overseas possessions known as the “DOM-TOM.” These 
include Guadalupe, Martinique, and French Guyana in the Caribbean and Réunion in the Indian 
Ocean. Individuals residing in these territories are French citizens. From 1972 the African 
immigrant population grew from 2.4 percent in 1979 to 9 percent in 1999. Asian populations 
went from 3.6 to 12.7 percent during the same period. Prior to World War II, many Magrhebis 
worked for a few years in France and then returned to their countries of origin. Audrey 
Célestine, French Caribbean Organizations and the ‘Black question’ in France, 4 AFR. & 
BLACK DIASPORA: INT. J. 131, 132 (2011); Virginie Guiraudon, Immigration Policy in France, 
THE BROOKINGS INST. (July 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/07/ 
0101france-guiraudon; HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 21 
 36. JOAN WALLACE SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, 42–90 (2007) 
 37. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 21 (1978); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND 
IMPERIALISM 317 (1994). 
 38. Historically the “Orient” referred to countries east of the Mediterranean. SAID, 
ORIENTALISM, supra, note 37, at 1. It denoted a distinction between western nations and those 
in northern Africa and Asia. “Orientalism” was originally a term used by art historians and 
other scholars to categorize depictions of Middle Eastern and East Asian cultures by artists and 
writers from the West. CHRISTINE PELTRE, ORIENTALISM IN ART 14 (Jacqueline Decter ed., 
John Goodman trans., 1998). 
 39. A major component of French culture is the conviction that its culture is superior to 
those of all non-Europeans. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 37, at 39. See also Matthew 
Olmsted, Are Things Falling Apart? Rethinking the Purpose and Function of International 
Law, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 407 (2005); William Lafi Youmans, Edward 
Said and Legal Scholarship, 3 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 107, 110 (2003–2004); see 
generally FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (Haakon Chevalier trans., 1965). 
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Europeans have regarded Asian and Middle Eastern people as an 
alien and threatening “other.”40 This version of the Arab world 
constructed by British and French scholars provided a justification 
for the colonization of Africa and the Middle East.
41
 Eighteenth and 
nineteenth century European scholars created a condescending and 
essentialist view of the Arab world that was not based on any actual 
knowledge or experience with Arabs, but rather on the product of 
imaginary constructions.
42
 
Attitudes about Orientalism were manifested in various ways. 
Many nineteenth century Orientalist paintings were propaganda used 
to support French imperialism. They depicted the East as a place of 
backwardness, lawlessness, and barbarism tamed by French rule.
43
 
Antoine-Jean Gros, a painter employed by Napoleon Bonaparte who 
never traveled to Africa or Asia himself, conveyed these ideas in 
paintings featuring Eastern architecture and individuals in exotic 
dress.
44
 Artists such as Eugène Delacroix employed themes that 
portrayed women as objects of violence and cruelty in their Oriental 
settings.
45
  
This subtle indoctrination has profoundly affected modern racism 
in France. Over the last two decades, a substantial body of empirical 
and theoretical work in cognitive psychology has confirmed that the 
causes of discriminatory actions often operate at an unconscious level 
without the perpetrator’s awareness of the source.46 Many ideas and 
beliefs formed during early childhood serve as a basis for judgments 
 
 40. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 37, at 39–40. SCOTT, supra note 36, at 49–57. 
 41. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 37, at 39–49. 
 42. Id. 
 43. TODD PORTERFIELD, THE ALLURE OF EMPIRE: ART IN THE SERVICE OF FRENCH 
IMPERIALISM 1798–1836, 132–34 (1998); Jennifer Meagher, Orientalism in Nineteenth–
Century Art, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/euor/ 
hd_euor.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
 44. PORTERFIELD, supra note 43, at 53–58. 
 45. Laurel Ma, The Real and Imaginary Harem: Assessing Delacroix’s Women of Algiers 
as an Imperialist Apparatus, 19 PENN HIST. REV. 9 (2011). 
 46. JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 425–28 (Beth Kaufman & Larry Goldberg 
eds., second ed., 1997); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in 
Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 
1473–74 (1998); CHERYL STAATS WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CHARLES PATTON, KIRWAN 
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2013 (2013), http:// 
kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit_Bias.pdf [hereinafter IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW] 
(contains a comprehensive review of the relevant literature). 
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about events, groups, and ideas during one’s adult years.47 Socialized 
beliefs can provoke negative sentiments when individuals’ decision-
making activates stereotypes.
48
 Stereotyping involves the creation of 
a mental image of a “typical” member of a particular category.49 
Individuals are perceived as undifferentiated members of a group, 
lacking any significant differences from other individuals within the 
group.
50
 Common traits are assigned to the entire group. When a 
particular behavior by a group member is observed, the viewer 
evaluates the behavior through the lens of the stereotype.
51
 This 
process causes the viewer to conclude that the conduct has 
empirically confirmed his stereotyped belief about the group. 
Stereotypes can be so deeply internalized that they persist even in the 
face of information that directly contradicts the stereotype.
52
 
The imagery of Orientalism is suffused with stereotypes of 
European superiority. Oriental men are often depicted as feminine 
and weak, but dangerous because their hypersexuality poses a threat 
to white, Western women.
53
 Oriental women are depicted as 
submissive and strikingly exotic. The Orient is seen as eccentric, 
backward, and sensual.
54
 European writers describing the Middle 
 
 47.  Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social Motivation 
Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 122 (2004); Susan T. Fiske, Examining the 
Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED 
THOUGH, 253, 253–83 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989) 
 48. IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW, supra note 46. Professor Frances Aboud, who conducted 
research on prejudice in young children, found that stereotypes develop between the ages of 
three and five. Frances E. Aboud & Maria Amato, Developmental and Socialization Influence 
on Intergroup Bias, in INTERGROUP PROCESSES 65 (Rupert Brown & Samuel Gaertner eds., 
2003). 
 49. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social 
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1246–50 (2002).  
 50. Blasi, supra note 49. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Robert L. Hayman Jr. & Leland Ware, The Geography of Discrimination: The Seattle 
and Louisiana Cases and the Legacy of Brown vs. Board of Education, in CHOOSING 
EQUALITY: ESSAYS AND NARRATIVES ON THE DESEGREGATION EXPERIENCE 312, 326 (Robert 
L. Hayman Jr. & Leland Ware eds., 2009); JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM, 10–11, 
(McGraw-Hill 2nd ed. 1997). Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal 
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 741–55 (1995); Tristin K. 
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate 
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 93 (2003).  
 53. SCOTT, supra note 36, at 55–60. 
 54. Id. at 49–60. 
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East reinforced an image of Arabs and Muslims as uniform, 
incompetent, and unreflective. This Orient was a creation of the 
Western imagination.
55
  
The Orientalists promoted specific stereotypes about Arabs—
including racial inferiority, Islamic fanaticism, and unbridled 
sexuality—that promoted a caricatured vision of the East.56 A French 
study published in 1903 described Algerians as having limited 
intelligence and being backwards and apathetic.
57
 It also said that 
they were undisciplined, dishonest, untrustworthy, and oversexed.
58
 
For much of the twentieth century, French advertisements, newspaper 
articles, and novels emphasized the exoticism of North Africans.
59
 As 
Joan Scott explained “a consensus [emerged] about the inferiority 
and/or strange customs and behaviors of North Africans.”60  
During the colonial era and well into the twentieth century, 
Orientalist representations of Arab women fell into two predominant 
stereotypes. One consisted of prostitutes and women with loose 
morals.
61
 The second is that of the “harem,” in which multiple 
women were cloistered and treated as submissive slaves by their 
husbands.
62
 Some of the most popular Orientalist paintings depict 
harems.
63
 Male artists relying largely on their imaginations, depicted 
opulently decorated interiors with luxuriant odalisques in the nude or 
in Oriental dress.
64
 Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres never traveled to 
the East, for example, but used the harem setting to present an erotic 
ideal in his voluptuous odalisques.
65
  
In French literature, Orientalist fantasies depicted Arab women as 
being driven by their sexual desires. One example of this fantasy is 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 49–50.  
 58. Id. at 49.  
 59. Dana S. Hale, French Images of Race on Product Trademarks During the Third 
Republic, in THE COLOR OF LIBERTY, HISTORIES OF RACE IN FRANCE 131–46 (Sue Peabody & 
Tyler Stovall eds., 2003). 
 60. SCOTT, supra note 36, at 50.  
 61. Id. at 49–60. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Alexandra Jopp, Romantic Orientalism: The Harem, available at 
http://bestamericanart.blogspot.com/2010/11/romantic-orientalism-harem.html 
 64. Meagher, supra note 43.  
 65. Id. 
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demonstrated by postcards that depicted Algerian women and 
circulated in France in the early decades of the twentieth century.
66
 
Although the photographs purported to be accurate depictions, they 
were actually posed in a photographer’s studio.67 The photographs 
were seen as evidence of the exotic and strange customs of Algerians 
when, in reality, they reflected colonialist fantasies.
68
 The stories and 
photographs were efforts to peer into Arab women’s private spaces.69 
Colonized women were depicted as morally corrupt, ignorant, or 
promiscuous individuals in need of the colonizers’ guidance to carry 
out their daily activities. Colonizers used these images to legitimize 
their colonial administration and to control indigenous women.
70
 
Orientalist stereotypes of this sort continue to shape French 
attitudes about North African immigrants and their descendants. As 
the discussion in subsequent sections of this Article will show, ethnic 
minorities are routinely denied employment opportunities and are 
subjected to what has been described by scholars as the “ethnic 
penalty” that job seekers encounter.71 Young banlieusards are widely 
regarded as criminals and subjected to harassment and harsh 
treatment by the French police.
72
 Islamic dress such as headscarves 
and burqas are regarded as threats to French society.
73
 These 
stereotypes are derived from beliefs developed in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries during which North Africans were 
regarded as inferior, dishonest and untrustworthy.
74
 Today, these 
 
 66. SCOTT, supra note 36, at 55–61; MALEK ALLOULA, THE COLONIAL HAREM, 3–7 
(1986); FRENCH ORIENTALISM: CULTURE, POLITICS AND THE IMAGINED OTHER 204 (Desmond 
Hosford & Chong J. Wojtkowski eds., 2010). 
 67. See generally MALEK ALLOULA, supra note 66. 
 68. See generally id. 
 69. WOMEN AND THE COLONIAL GAZE 1–16 (Tamara L. Hunt & Micheline R. Lessard 
eds., 2002) (examining gender, imperialism, and the ways in which colonizers used images of 
women to define colonial relationships); see generally ZACHARY LOCKMAN, CONTENDING 
VISIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF ORIENTALISM (Eugene L Rogen 
ed., 2004); see generally VISIONS OF THE EAST: ORIENTALISM IN FILM (Matthew Bernstein & 
Gaylyn Studlar eds., 1997). 
 70. SCOTT, supra note 36, at 46–47.  
 71. See infra Part VII. 
 72. See infra Part VII. 
 73. See infra Part IX. 
 74. SCOTT, supra note 36, at 52.  
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stereotypes persist and have a profound effect on the lived 
experiences of ethnic minorities in France. 
III. “TOO MANY IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE”: EFFORTS TO END 
MAGHREBIAN IMMIGRATION 
[I]f you were a French worker, who worked along with your 
wife and together earned 15,000 francs and you lived in public 
housing next to a man with three or four wives, twenty 
children, who took home 50,000 francs a month from welfare, 
without working. And if in addition, you had to deal with the 
noise and the smell, well the French worker goes crazy. 
 —Jacques Chirac, former President of France 75  
Chirac’s contemptuous comments reflect the sentiments of a large 
portion of the French population. A majority of French citizens resent 
the presence of ethnic minority immigrants in France.
76
 A 2013 
survey showed that 70 percent of the French population believes too 
many foreigners reside in the country.
77 
Since the mid-1970s, France 
has attempted to stem the tide of immigrants from North and sub-
Saharan Africa.
78
 This change in policy was adopted after the 1973 
oil crisis and the end of the “trente glorieuses,”79 in an economic 
recession that dampened the need for foreign labor.
80
 This resulted in 
high levels of unemployment.
81
 In 1974, under the government 
headed by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, France officially suspended 
 
 75. Schneider, supra note 3, at 144. 
 76. Alex Felton, Too Many Immigrants in France, Sarkozy Says, CNN (Mar. 7, 2012, 
11:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/07/world/europe/france-politics/; Joseph Bamat, Too 
Many Immigrants in France, Says Ex-PM Fillon, FRANCE 24 (June 7, 2013), http:// 
www.france24.com/en/20130607-fillon-france-immigration-presidential-election-2017-ump/; 
Ben McPartland, ‘Too Many Foreigners in France’, French say, THE LOCAL (Jan. 25, 2013, 
7:35 PM), http://www.thelocal.fr/20130125/too-many-foreigners-in-france-french-say. 
 77. McPartland, supra note 76. 
 78. The Challenge, supra note 2.  
 79. Review: Sarah Wilson Art, Artefact, and Empire? Thirty Glorious Years in France 
Oxford Art J (2013) 36 (2): 310-312  
 80. Hamilton, Simon & Veniard, supra note 2. 
 81. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CAL., 1973–74 Oil Crisis, THE BANCROFT LIBR. (Mar. 
7, 2011), http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html.  
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immigration.
82
 There were exceptions to this policy, but it was 
expected that the immigration of non-Europeans would decrease, but 
in reality, the policy had the opposite effect.
83
 Rather than slowing 
the influx immigrants, migration shifted from individual male 
workers to family reunification.
84
 Migrants moved to France in large 
numbers to join family members who were already there, 
contributing significantly to immigration from 1970 to 2000.
85
 The 
French government attempted to impose a ban on family 
reunifications, but that effort was declared unlawful.
86
 The French 
government made efforts to reduce the numbers of non-Europeans 
immigrating to France by encouraging immigrants to return to their 
home countries; many were forcibly deported.
87
 This policy led to an 
increase in the minority population as many non-European 
immigrants feared losing access to jobs in France if they left the 
country. Many who might have left remained and brought their 
families to live with them in France. The result was an increase in 
France’s ethnic minority population as many workers had large 
families and, in some cases, multiple wives. The informal “rotation” 
system ended.
88
  
In his 2007 book, Alex Hargreaves reported that approximately 
one hundred thousand foreigners became French citizens each year.
89
 
More than half of the foreigners who applied for citizenship were of 
African origin. About half of the foreigners were admitted through 
formal citizenship procedures.
90
 The remaining foreigners were 
divided between foreigners who acquired citizenship through 
marriage to a French spouse and the children of foreign parents born 
in France who became French citizens when they reach the age of 
 
 82. Sybille Regout, The Integration of Immigrant Communities in France, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands: National Models in a European Context 24 (Migration Studies 
Working Papers No. 2011/09, 2011), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/research/ 
resgroups/MSU/documents/workingPapers/WP_2011_09.pdf. 
 83. Id.; see also HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
 84. HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
 85. Id. at 25. 
 86. Id. at 25–26. 
 87. Id. at 26. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 28, 
 90. Id. at 28–29. 
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majority.
91
 As of 1993, children of immigrants do not automatically 
become citizens upon reaching the age of majority but are required to 
formally request citizenship.
92
  
Immigration has been a potent political issue since the 1980s 
through, among other things, the influence of the National Front.
93
 
This far right political party was founded on October 5, 1972, by 
activists of the nationalist movement Ordre Nouveau (“New Order”), 
attempting an electoral come-back for the French extreme right.
94
 
Jean-Marie Le Pen was chosen as president of the new movement, an 
ex-paratrooper who served in in the French Foreign Legion. He was a 
former president of the Nationalist Students’ Association of Paris.95 
 The National Front’s agenda consists of racist and xenophobic 
attacks on immigrants.
96
 The party has attracted a significant portion 
of the French electorate with its demagogic demands to deport 
Muslim immigrants. A cornerstone of its agenda is the “France for 
the French” slogan. The policies associated with the National Front 
include ending further immigration and making it increasingly harder 
for the foreigners already in France to get their citizenship.
97
 Le Pen 
pledged an immediate end to all immigration and to send all 
foreigners home. Le Pen consistently related the influx of foreigners 
to unemployment and crime.
98
 The success of the National Front is 
based on its ability to attract and influence voters who support other 
political parties.
99
 This is one of the reasons immigration has 
remained a hotly contested issue since the 1980s.
100
 In April 2002, Le 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 30; Roya Hajbandeh, “France, Love It or Leave It”: New French Law Restricts 
Family Reunification, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 335, 338–40 (2009). 
 93. PAUL HAINSWORTH, THE EXTREME RIGHT IN FRANCE: THE RISE AND RISE OF JEAN‐
MARIE LE PEN’S FRONT NATIONAL, 40 REPRESENTATION 101, 105–06 (2004); see generally 
JONATHAN MARCUS, THE NATIONAL FRONT AND FRENCH POLITICS: THE RESISTIBLE RISE OF 
JEAN-MARIE LE PEN (1995); PETER DAVIES, NATIONAL FRONT IN FRANCE: IDEOLOGY, 
DISCOURSE AND POWER (1999). 
 94. HAINSWORTH supra note 93.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 107; MUSTAFA DIKEC, BADLANDS OF THE REPUBLIC: SPACE, POLITICS AND 
URBAN POLICY 57 (2007).  
 97. Hajbandeh, supra note 92, at 338; MARCUS, supra note 93. 
 98. HAINSWORTH, supra note 93, at 106; see also Marcus, supra note 93; DAVIES, supra 
note 93. 
 99. HAINSWORTH, supra note 93. 
 100. See generally id. 
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Pen shocked the political establishment when he won 16.9 percent of 
the vote in the first round of voting in the French presidential 
election. This left him only three percentage points behind the 
incumbent right-wing candidate, President Jacques Chirac, who 
received only 19.9 percent of the vote. The outcome of Le Pen’s 
performance in 2002 surpassed the 1988 vote, in a clear showing that 
the National Front has only gained popularity over time.
101
  
France’s left and right wing political parties have turned 
immigration into political football since the 1980s.
102
 After national 
elections, each newly installed government has attempted to modify 
legislation enacted by the previous administration.
103
 Major reforms 
were enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the loi Bonnet which 
was enacted on January 10, 1980 by a right-wing government, the loi 
Bonnet authorized officials to deport undocumented migrants.
104
 In 
1981, after a new government took office, limited amnesty was 
granted for undocumented immigrants who entered France prior to 
January 1, 1981, and had proof of employment.
105
 The “Pasqua laws” 
of 1993, named after interior minister Charles Pasqua, attempted to 
dramatically limit immigration by prohibiting foreign graduates from 
accepting French jobs and denying the graduates resident status.
106
 
The law increased the waiting period for family reunification and 
denied residency permits to foreign spouses who had been in the 
country without legal authorization prior to marrying.
107
 The laws of 
1993 were so restrictive that illegal migration increased. The drastic 
reduction in legal avenues to immigration caused migrants to resort to 
extra-legal means to enter France.
108
 As a response, the loi Debré was 
implemented on April 24, 1997, but proved to be as restrictive as 
 
 101. Brenna Daldorph, Historically, Voters Don’t Follow the Front National’s Advice, LE 
FIGARO (Apr. 26, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://plus.lefigaro.fr/note/historically-voters-dont-follow-
the-front-nationals-advice-20120426-905492 (this is the internet cite) 
 102. Virginie Guiraudon, Immigration Policy in France: U.S.-France Analysis, THE 
BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 01, 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/07/0101 
france-guiraudon. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See generally Regout, supra note 82, at 25. The loi Bonnet is named after Christian 
Bonnet, Minister of the Interior from 1977 to 1981. Regout, supra note, 82, at 25.  
 105. Regout, supra note, 82, at 25.  
 106. Id. at 25–26.  
 107. Hajbandeh, supra note 92, at 338. 
 108. Id. at 339.  
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earlier laws.
109
 The right-wing government was defeated in 1997 and, 
on May 11, 1998, the newly elected leftist government enacted a law 
governing the status of foreigners that relaxed immigration 
restrictions imposed by the previous administration 
110
 In 2006, an 
immigration and integration law was enacted, which overhauled 
France’s immigration system and gave the government powers to 
encourage high-skilled migration, fight illegal migration more 
effectively, and restrict family immigration.
111
 The effort to enact the 
law was led by Nicolas Sarkozy, the then Interior Minister.
112
 The 
law’s objectives were to recruit skilled workers, facilitate foreign 
students’ residencies, tighten the rules on family reunification, and 
limit access to residence and citizenship.
113
  
France’s efforts to control immigration have failed. At some point, 
France will have to accept the reality of an increasingly diverse 
population. The immigration laws do not recognize the nation’s 
current demographic composition. As one researcher explained, “[i]n 
1999, France’s resident population of foreign or partially foreign 
origin (immigrants or persons born in France with at least one 
immigrant parent or grandparent) represented around 13.5 million 
people, equivalent to between a quarter and a fifth of the total 
population.”114 The immigration laws fail to recognize the nation’s 
current demographic composition. France’s ethnic minority 
population does not consist entirely of first-generation immigrants. 
Many residents with North and sub-Saharan ancestors are second and 
third-generation French citizens. The government has made 
continuous efforts to keep North and sub-Saharan African immigrants 
out while failing to address the needs of the French nationals with 
African ancestry. The conflicts involving ethnic minorities are as 
much matters of domestic policy as they are immigration issues. The 
 
 109. Regout, supra note 82, at 26. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Kara Murphy, France’s New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly 
Skilled, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (Nov. 2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org/ 
feature/display.cfm?ID=486. 
 112. Murphy, supra note 111. 
 113. Id. at 3. 
 114. Michèle Tribalat, An Estimation of the Foreign-Origin Populations of France in 1999, 
59(1) POPULATION, 49 (2004) (Fr.).  
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French government must recognize and address this if it expects to 
ameliorate racial tensions in France. 
IV. BANLIEUES: THE OTHER FRANCE 
Paris and other large cities in France are surrounded by suburban 
communities in which large numbers of ethnic minority families 
reside. In Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics 
and Social Exclusion, Professor Tricia Keaton examined the 
conditions that prevail in Pantin, a banlieue adjacent to Paris. To 
underscore the stark contrast with the romantic connotation of Paris 
as “the City of Light,”115 Keaton designated banlieues symbolically as 
“the other France.”116 The ethnically segregated cités (public housing 
complexes) in France are the legacy of government-subsidized 
housing developed to accommodate workers during Paris’ 
industrialization in the nineteenth century. From the mid-1950s until 
the mid-1970s, foreign families living in France were not eligible to 
reside in public housing.
117
 During this time, French authorities 
treated Africans and Maghrebis as temporary residents and 
discouraged the reunification of immigrant families in France. 
Discrimination against immigrants was widespread.
118
 Many of them 
were relegated to the shantytowns on the outskirts of French cities 
without running water or electricity.
119
  
In the late 1950s, a government agency was established that 
constructed hostels for foreign workers.
120
 Sonacotra, the National 
 
 115. The French capital is often referred to as “La Ville-Lumière” (“The City of Light”). 
The name is said to come from its reputation as a center of education and ideas during the Age 
of Enlightenment. See e.g., MARY MCAULIFFE PARIS DISCOVERED: EXPLORATIONS IN THE 
CITY OF LIGHT (2006). 
 116. TRICA DANIELLE KEATON, MUSLIM GIRLS AND THE OTHER FRANCE: RACE, IDENTITY 
POLITICS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION (2006); see also Keith Richburg, The Other France, 
Separate and Unhappy, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005111102277.html. 
 117. Sylvie Tissot, “French Suburbs”: A New Problem or a New Approach to Social 
Exclusion? 2 (Ctr. for European Studies, Working Paper Series No. 160, 2008), available at 
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/28/50/25/PDF/CES_160-tissot-frenchSuburbs.pdf (2008). 
 118. Sophie Gonick, Disciplining the Metropolis: Grand Paris, Immigration and the 
Banlieue, 24(1) BERKELEY PLAN. J. 26, 30 (2011). 
 119. AZOUZ BEGAG, SHANTYTOWN KID (Alec G. Hargreaves ed., Naïma Wolf & Alec G. 
Hargreaves, trans., Univ. of Neb. Press) (2007); Gonick, supra note 118, at 29–30. 
 120. Gregory Verdugo, Public Housing and Residential Segregation of Immigrants in 
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Society of Housing for Workers, also constructed accommodations 
for migrant workers between 1965 and 1975.
121
 The “foyer 
Sonacotra” provided accommodations for Maghrebis and sub-
Saharan Africans from Senegal and Mali.
122
 The housing was 
designed to accommodate single, male migrants in dormitory-like 
facilities that were not suitable for families.
123
 Working in a similar 
fashion, the government agency, Habitations à Loyer Modéré 
(housing at moderated rents or “HLM”), demolished shantytowns in 
the 1970s and encouraged the residents to move into HLM-
constructed public housing.
124
 Families were eligible to live in HLM 
housing if the head of the family was authorized to live in France and 
household income was below a threshold based on the region of the 
residence.
125
 Eligible families could “apply for a HLM [unit] in any 
city where such public programs exist, regardless of their current 
place of residence or nationality.”126  
Many of the original public housing residents in communities 
surrounding Paris were French citizens who worked in nearby 
factories.
127
 They were hired in large numbers in the 1960s when the 
factories needed unskilled labor.
128
 The HLM provided centralized 
housing, shopping, education, and recreation in planned communities 
close to the factories in which residents worked.
129
 In the 1960s and 
early 1970s, HLM created one hundred and ninety-five planned 
housing complexes, mostly in Paris.
130
 Large housing developments 
were constructed with a minimum of five hundred units in high-rise 
 
France, 1968–1999, (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5456, 2011). 
 121. See generally id. at 10.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Tissot, supra note 117, at 2. 
 125. Denis Fougère et al., Social Housing and Location Choices of Immigrants in France 4 
(Inst. for the Study of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 5557, 2011), available at http://ftp.iza.org/ 
dp5557.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Paul A. Silverstein & Chantal Tetreault, Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, in RIOTS IN 
FRANCE WEB ESSAYS, SSRC.ORG (June 11, 2006), http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Silverstein_ 
Tetreault [hereinafter Postcolonial Urban Apartheid] 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Gonick, supra note 118. 
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towers and low-rise blocks on large land tracts.
131
 The intention was 
to create an attractive, planned community for the working class on 
the suburban periphery where new factories were being developed 
and where there was an abundance of open space.
132
 The 
developments were designed to be self-contained neighborhoods with 
shops, schools, and other services to meet the needs of the 
residents.
133
  
The complexes were inspired by Swiss architect Le Corbusier’s 
“radiant city” designs, in which housing for low-income families 
consisted of large blocks of individual apartments stacked in a high 
rise building.
134
 The buildings were set on pylons, five meters off the 
ground, to maximize ground level green space.
135
 The floor plans 
included a living room, bedrooms, kitchen, and garden terrace.
136
 Le 
Corbusier believed his design would provide sunlight and fresh air to 
city laborers, who had lived in narrow and unsanitary alleys and back 
streets since the beginning of urbanization in France.
137
 
 
 131. Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra note 127, at 3. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Alexi Ferster Marmot, The Legacy of Le Corbusier and High-Rise Housing, 7 BUILT 
ENV’T 82, 84–85 (1981). The most famous of these buildings, also known as Cité radieuse is 
located in Marseille, France. It was constructed between 1947 and 1952. It was internationally 
influential and was used as a model for designing public housing projects in Europe and 
America. Id. at 89–93. 
 135. Id. at 88. 
 136. Id. at 85; see also Alexander Gorlin, The Ghost in the Machine: Surrealism in the 
Work of Le Corbusier, 18 PERSPECTA 50–65 (1982), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
1567035. Other photographic depictions can be found at the Le Corbusier foundation’s website 
http://www.fondationlecorbusier.fr/corbuweb/morpheus.aspx?sysId=13&IrisObjectId=5234&sy
sLanguage=en-en&itemPos=58&itemCount=78&sysParentId=64&sysParentName=home. 
 137. Le Corbusier was hailed as a visionary designer and urban planner, but found his 
designs problematic for the well-being of the residents. In 1947, a delegation from Glasgow, 
Scotland, visited Marseilles to observe the tower blocks designed by Le Corbusier. A high-rise 
policy was subsequently implemented in Glasgow. Many of the developments quickly 
deteriorated into dingy, ill-kempt dwellings that contributed to the occupants’ social exclusion. 
Id.; Post War Housing, WELCOME TO GLASGOW, http://www.glasgow.gov.uk/index.aspx? 
articleid=3471 (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). Le Corbusier’s grand vision of lifting workers from 
unsanitary shantytowns resulted in the created of desolate and dangerous high rise slums. As 
Witold Rybczyski explained, “[Le Corbusier] called it La Ville Radieuse, the Radiant City. 
Despite the poetic title, his urban vision was authoritarian, inflexible and simplistic. Wherever it 
was tried—in Chandigarh by Le Corbusier himself or in Brasilia by his followers—it failed. 
Standardization proved inhuman and disorienting. The open spaces were inhospitable; the 
bureaucratically imposed plan, socially destructive. In the United States, the Radiant City took 
the form of vast urban-renewal schemes and regimented public housing projects that damaged 
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In the 1970s, the French government began to promote home 
ownership.
138
 The government made low-interest loans available to 
working-class French families living in public housing. As a result 
many French families moved out of cités.
139
 Middle class residents 
abandoned the housing projects en masse in favor of small bungalows 
in the suburbs.
140
 The “white flight” of French families from the cités 
was also motivated by a desire to distance themselves from 
immigrants.
141
 North and sub-Saharan African immigrant families 
moved into public housing at a time when the residences were 
increasingly being seen as undesirable places to live. These new 
residents were often poorer than their predecessors and had fewer 
opportunities for advancement.
142
 When immigration was halted in 
1975, deindustrialization hit the suburbs much harder and lasted 
much longer than other areas in France.
143
 Service positions replaced 
industrial jobs. As the factories that provided work shut down, 
significant demographic shifts ensued.
144
 The banlieues slowly 
transformed into segregated spaces.
145
  
Most of the shopping centers built in the centers of the housing 
projects closed. Smaller stores in and near the complexes experienced 
high turnover rates.
146
 The concrete and pre-fabricated materials used 
in the construction of the cités deteriorated.
147
 By the early 1990s, 80 
 
the urban fabric beyond repair. Today these megaprojects are being dismantled, as superblocks 
give way to rows of houses fronting streets and sidewalks. Downtowns have discovered that 
combining, not separating, different activities is the key to success. So is the presence of lively 
residential neighborhoods, old as well as new. Cities have learned that preserving history makes 
a lot more sense than starting from zero. It has been an expensive lesson, and not one that Le 
Corbusier intended, but it too is part of his legacy.” WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, Le Corbusier, in 
PEOPLE OF THE CENTURY: ONE HUNDRED MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE SHAPED THE LAST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS 131 (1999). 
 138. See generally Fougère, supra note 125, at 4. 
 139. See generally id. 
 140. Jocelyne Cesari, Ethnicity, Islam, and les banlieues: Confusing the Issues (Nov. 30, 
2005), available at http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Cesari/. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra note 127; see generally Graham Murray, 
France: the Riots and the Republic, 47 RACE AND CLASS 26, 30–31(2006). 
 146. Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra note 127. 
 147. Id. 
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percent of the buildings suffered “from some combination of water 
damage, insulation problems, broken elevators, and similar 
problems.”148 From 1982 to 1999, the proportion of French nationals 
and immigrants from Europe residing in public housing rose by only 
1 percent.
149
 Residency rates for non-European immigrants increased 
by 10 percent and, in some cases, 15 percent.
150
 In 1999, a 28 percent 
gap existed between the residency rates of Maghrebis and French 
nationals.
151
 The differences in residency rates across immigrant 
groups in 1999 were significant, particularly between Europeans 
(19.7 percent) and non-Europeans (79.3 percent).
152
 Within the 
immigrant population, Maghrebis and Africans had the highest 
residency rates at 47.9 percent and 43.5 percent, respectively.
153
  
From 1990 to 1999, residential segregation of North and sub-
Saharan Africans increased.
154
 Researchers found that it was more 
difficult for these groups to move away from disadvantaged 
neighborhoods than French nationals.
155
 In one study focusing on the 
Paris region, the authors prepared an index of dissimilarity
156
 that 
showed North and sub-Saharan Africans were concentrated to the 
north of Paris (in the Seine-Saint-Denis district and the southern part 
of the Val-d’Oise district) and south of Paris (in the western part of 
the Val de Marne district).
157
 Consequently, the researchers 
determined that these groups were significantly segregated from 
 
 148. Id.; Yvonne Yazbeck et al, The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration Policy 
or the Empire Strikes Back? 44 INT’L MIGRATION 27 (2006). 
 149. Verdugo, supra note 120 at 11. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Gonick, supra note 118, at 30–31. 
 155. Id. 
 156. An index of dissimilarity is a measure from 0 to 1, in which higher numbers indicated 
more segregation between two groups. This measure computes the sum total in a larger area of 
the differences in the relative populations in subareas. RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
MEASUREMENT PROJECT, Racial Segregation: What it is And How We Measure It, 
http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/seg.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2014). 
 157. Laurent Gobillon & Harris Selod, The Effects of Segregation and Spatial Mismatch on 
Unemployment: Evidence From France, NAT’L INST. OF STATISTICS & ECON. STUD. 1, 7 
(2007), available at http://www.crest.fr/images/doctravail/2007-04.pdf. 
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French nationals.
158
 An even residential mix would require 32 percent 
of North and sub-Saharan Africans to relocate.
159
  
In 2009, France’s 4.5 million public housing units represented 17 
percent of the country’s housing stock.160 Approximately 55 percent 
of the public housing was constructed before 1976, including 1.12 
million units constructed between 1966 and 1975, when many large 
HLMs were built on the outer edges of French cities.
161
 Immigrant 
households represented 9.5 percent of the total population in 2002 
and they occupied 22 percent of the public housing units.
162
 About 29 
percent of immigrant households lived in public housing, compared 
to 14 percent of non-immigrants.
163
 Families from Turkey, the 
Maghreb, and sub-Saharan Africa had much higher percentages: 44 
percent, 48 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
164
  
The high-rise design of public housing proved to be an urban 
planning disaster. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the term 
“banlieue” has become synonymous with French suburban 
neighborhoods.
165
 Powerful stereotypes have been attached to the 
term “immigration” which alludes to unskilled, non-European 
workers.
166
 The non-European immigrant population is regarded as a 
threat to national unity and identity. These stereotypes are associated 
with the banlieues based on the large numbers of immigrants residing 
in those areas.
167
 However, the majority of young banlieusards are 
French citizens born and raised in France, with little to no connection 
to the origins of their ancestors.
168
  
In Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced 
Marginality, Professor Loïc Wacquant compared French banlieues to 
 
 158. Id. at 7. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Kathleen Scanlon & Christine Whitehead, French Social Housing in an International 
Context 5 (OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 862, 2011), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kgcd9s0q8f8-en. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 8.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Matthew Moran, Opposing Exclusion: The Political Significance of the Riots in 
French Suburbs (2005–2007), 19 MODERN & CONTEMP. FR. 297, 303 (2011). 
 166. Id. (citing HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 26). 
 167. Moran, supra note 165, at 303–04. 
 168. Moran, supra note 165, at 303–04. 
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America’s inner city ghettoes. He explained how the decline of 
America’s urban core after the 1960s resulted from private practices 
and public policies of racial separation and urban abandonment.
169
 In 
France, the spread of banlieues is caused by the decline of working-
class communities resulting from deindustrialization, high-levels of 
unemployment, and the spatial concentration of immigrant families in 
deteriorating public housing.
170
 Wacquant concluded that France’s 
banlieues were not as vast and mono-racial as America’s inner city 
ghettos, but share many of the same negative attributes and 
deleterious effects on the residents.
171
 In his book, Algeria in France, 
Paul Silverstein observed that public housing originally constructed 
for factory workers to ease their commutes from home and work 
“function now as site[s] of spatial isolation, economic exclusion and 
social containment, reinforcing the physical and mental boundaries 
between city and suburbs . . . .”172   
 
 169. LOÏC WACQUANT, URBAn OUTCASTS: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF ADVANCED 
MARGINALITY 3–4 (2008). 
 170. Id. at 5. 
 171. Id. 
 172. PAUL SILVERSTEIN, ALGERIA IN FRANCE: TRANSPOLITICs, RACE, AND NATION 78 
(2004). There may changes on the way for some neighborhoods. Mira Ksamdar, Editorial, The 
Other Paris, Beyond the Boulevards, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/11/10/opinion/sunday/the-other-paris-beyond-the-boulevards.html?ref=opinion. A 
New York Times essay, The Other Paris, Beyond the Boulevards, was written by an author who 
resides in Pantin, where the northeastern banlieues begin. Id. Many of her neighbors are 
immigrants from Africa, South Asia, China, and Vietnam. Others are Poles, Ukrainians, 
Russians, and Serbs. Id. She observed that the old mills in Pantin have been transformed into 
offices for the banking giant BNP Paribas. Id. Chanel placed its headquarters nearby and 
Hermès purchased several blocks for new ateliers. Id. Apartment buildings are being 
constructed with units reserved for affordable housing and canal-side cafes. Id. A Chinese 
supermarket and a high-end art gallery opened in an old warehouse. Id. Ksamdar suggests that 
“the future of this great city is on its periphery” because it is rapidly gentrifying and the housing 
is far more affordable than it is in Paris . . . . Id. 
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V. THE FRENCH RIOTS 
The only way to deal with an unfree world is to become so 
absolutely free that your very existence is an act of rebellion.
173
 
—Albert Camus 
In 2005, three weeks of riots of unprecedented proportions 
erupted in several French cities. However, rioting in France’s 
banlieues has been a regular occurrence over the last three decades. 
Almost all of the incidents were triggered by police officers’ 
mistreatment of young banlieuesards. In the summer of 1981, several 
women, children, and elderly residents of the Cité de la Cayolle in 
Marseilles were injured during a police raid. Young male residents 
retaliated by fire-bombing local shopping centers and police 
stations.
174
 During the same period, the Lyon suburb of Les 
Minguettes erupted in a series of violent confrontations between 
young residents and police that became known as the “rodeo riots.”175 
In an estimated two hundred and fifty separate “rodeos,” groups of 
young men would steal a car, engage the police in a high-speed 
chase, and then abandon and burn the vehicle as an act of defiance.
176
 
 On June 20, 1983, Toumi Djaïdja, the president of SOS Avenir 
Minguettes, was critically wounded by police officers during a police 
raid.
177
 This episode of police brutality inspired the March for 
Equality against Racism.
178
 A handful of marchers (mostly from the 
Minguettes) set out from Marseille on October 15, 1983.
179
 By the 
time they arrived in Paris on December 3rd, the march had grown to 
include approximately one hundred thousand demonstrators.
180
 The 
 
 173. Albert Camus, available at http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/Albert+Camus/1/ 
index.html. 
 174. Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra note 127; Ahmed Boubeker, The outskirts of 
politics: The struggles of the descendants of postcolonial immigration in France, 24 FRENCH 
CULTURAL STUDIES 184, 186 (2013). 
 175. Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra note 127. 
 176. Mustafa Dikeç, BADLANDS OF THE REPUBLIC: SPACE. POLITICS, AND URBAN POLICY, 
43–48 (2007) (citing Adil Jazouli, Les années banlieues (1992)). 
 177. Boubeker, supra note 174, at 187. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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march received national attention when the President, François 
Mitterrand, received a delegation of marchers at the Élysée Palace.
181
 
The violent confrontations between Meghrebi descended immigrants 
and police in the 1980s resulted in the creation of the Beur 
movement, a nationwide protest against racism.
182
 The word Beur 
was coined by reversing the syllables of the word arabe, which 
means Arabic or Arab in French and is frequently used to refer to 
second generation Meghrbins.
183
 The leaders of the Beur movement 
gradually became integrated in the local and national political 
elites.
184
 
Other conflicts erupted in the 1990s. On October 6, 1990, violence 
broke out in the neighborhood of Vaulx-en-Velin, a suburb of 
Lyon.
185
 A motorbike on which two young men were riding was 
struck by a police car and one of the young men was killed.
186
 Local 
youths believed that the police intentionally collided with the 
motorcycle riders and responded by burning cars, looting stores, and 
throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police.
187
 Officers on the 
scene used tear gas and truncheons to subdue the rioters. The riots 
continued for two days before calm was restored.
188
 
In 1991, a riot was set off in a low-income suburb after a teenager 
arrested during weekend rioting died of heart failure while he was in 
police custody.
189
 Aissa Ihich became ill while being transferred from 
the Mantes-La-Jolie Jail to a court appearance in Versailles.
190
 Ihich 
was taken to the hospital in Mantes-La-Jolie, where he died from 
asthma related asphyxiation. The death exacerbated tensions in the 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. SILVERSTEIN, ALGERIA IN FRANCE, supra note 172, at 160–66. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Erik Bleich et al., State Responses to ‘Ethnic Riots’ in Liberal Democracies: Evidence 
from Western Europe, 2 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 269, 284 (2010). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Patrick McDowell, Youth Suspected of Riot Dies in Police Custody, THE ASSOC. 
PRESS, May 27, 1991, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Youth-Suspected-of-Riot-Dies-in-
Police-Custody/id-870c5a96c110358b1028cddfd33c170c; Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra 
note 127, at 3. 
 190. Postcolonial Urban Apartheid, supra note 127. 
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Paris suburb of Mantes-La-Jolie.
191
 Two hours after news of the death 
circulated, approximately one hundred people gathered at a local 
shopping center and began hurling rocks at passing police cars.
192
 
Riot police surrounded the demonstrators but did not intervene.
193
 
Several young men attacked two journalists leaving the Ihich home 
after interviewing family members.
194
 The journalists suffered minor 
injuries.
195
 Hundreds of youths in the Val Fourre housing project 
engaged in battles with police.
196
 A shopping center was looted and 
cars were set on fire.
197
 Police were attacked with firebombs and 
baseball bats. Three officers were hurt and eleven alleged rioters 
were arrested.
198
 Similar confrontations took place in Toulouse, 
Saint-Etienne, Chanteloup-Les-Vignes, and Lyon in a series of 
banlieues riots in 1991.
199
  
In 2005, the beginning of what became three weeks of rioting 
erupted on October 2, 2005 when two youngsters in the Parisian 
suburb Clichy sous Bois were accidentally electrocuted when they 
entered a transformer house owned by the national electricity 
company.
200
 Nine boys between the ages of fourteen and seventeen 
were on their way home from a soccer match.
201
 They were crossing 
a construction site when they saw the police Anti-Crime Brigade.
202
 
The police ordered the boys to stop and show their identification 
papers.
203
 As the boys had not brought their identification papers with 
them, they knew they would be taken to the police station for 
questioning. Hoping to avoid detention, the boys took off and the 
police went after them.
204
  
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Schneider, supra note 3, at 134–36; Bleich, supra note 185, at 286. 
 201. Id. at 135. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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The police seized six of the boys. The remaining three were 
cornered against an eight-foot wall topped with barbed wire and 
bearing large signs that said, “Caution: the electricity is stronger than 
you” and “Stop, don’t risk your life.”205 Pictures of skulls and 
crossbones were on the signs.
206
 The three boys climbed the wall into 
the substation and searched for an exit.
207
 One of the boys touched a 
transformer, instantly killing himself and a second boy. The third boy 
was saved by a power surge that cut electricity to the town. The 
survivor rescaled the wall. When he emerged, he saw that no one was 
outside because the police had left the area.
208
 
For the next three weeks, riots spread like wildfire from suburb to 
suburb. The turmoil affected hundreds of towns. Images of flaming 
cars filled news reports as approximately ten thousand cars were 
torched. Four thousand rioters were arrested and one hundred and 
twenty-five police officers were wounded. The rioters, many of them 
teenagers, were mainly of North and West African descent. The 
government declared the riots over on November 17th, 2005 after the 
number of cars torched the night before fell below one hundred.
209
 
French officials attributed the riots to negative stereotypes about 
immigrants. Some officials interpreted the riots as an excuse for 
“delinquents” to engage in violence and destruction.210 Nicolas 
Sarkozy, then the Minister of the Interior, described the banlieues as 
neighborhoods dominated by mafia-like organizations where even the 
police were afraid to visit.
211
 A few days before the 2005 riots, 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. French Riots, BBC (Nov. 14, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4413964.stm; 
Fresh Violence Hits Paris Suburbs, BBC (Nov. 3, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
4401670.stm; Craig S. Smith, Immigrant Rioting Flares in France for Ninth Night, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 5, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/05/international/europe/05france.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0; French Riots Spread Beyond Paris, BBC (Nov. 4, 2005), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/europe/4405620.stm; Jonathan Laurence & Justin Vaisse, Understanding Urban Riots 
in France, BROOKINGS (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/ 
12/01france-laurence; Keith Richburg, The Other France, Separate and Unhappy, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 12, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005 
111102277.html.  
 210.  Moran, supra note 165, at 301 (listing examples of French officials connecting 
“delinquents” with the cause of the riots). 
 211. Id. at 301. 
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Sarkozy had promised to “clean the suburbs with water hoses” and 
called the banlieuesards “racaille,” a term translated in the media as 
“scum,” but reportedly carries racist connotations.212 After the riots, 
the literary theorist Tzvetan Todorov attributed the violence to the 
dysfunctional sexuality of Muslim youths obsessed with behaving in 
a “macho” way.213 One week after the riots, prominent French 
historian, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, told Russian media that the 
riots were caused by the polygamous marital practices of Muslim 
immigrants from West Africa.
214
 The French Employment Minister, 
Gérard Larcher, agreed with d’Encausse and told British media that it 
was no surprise that young men from polygamous families 
experienced difficulty finding jobs.
215
 Nicholas Sarkozy said “[t]he 
central cause of unemployment, of despair, of violence in the suburbs 
is not discrimination or the failure of the schools—it is drug traffic, 
the law of bands, the dictatorship of fear and the resignation of the 
Republic.”216 
These disparaging comments exposed the stereotypical attitudes 
that some prominent French citizens have about ethnic minorities in 
France. These statements were not the product of any thoughtful 
reflection or careful research. They were angry outbursts that exposed 
the racial attitudes of the individuals who made the statements. In 
Opposing Exclusion: The Political Significance of the Riots in 
French Suburbs (2005–2007), Matthew Moran evaluated the 
significance of the banlieue riots.
217
 He argued that political 
discussions about the riots were dominated by security-oriented 
interpretations that did not look beyond the acts of violence and 
destruction inflicted by young banlieue residents.
218
 The 2005 rioters 
 
 212. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Michael J. Balz, The October Riots in France: A Failed 
Immigration Policy or the Empire Strikes Back?, 44 INT’L MIGRATION 24, 24–30 (2006); 
Abbey C. Furlong, Cultural Integration in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Immigration Policies of France and Spain, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 681, 689–
90 (2010);  
 213. Alec G. Hargreaves, An Emperor with No Clothes?, SSRC (Nov. 28, 2005), 
http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Hargreaves [hereinafter An Emperor]; Schneider, supra note 3, at 
137. 
 214. Schneider, supra note 3, at 137. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Opposing Exclusion, supra note 210.  
 218. Id. at 299–302. 
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were not immigrants; many of them were second- and third-
generation French citizens.
219
 French politicians on the left and the 
right had long denied that discrimination was a serious problem. 
Meanwhile, everyday racism persisted with minority citizens being 
routinely denied jobs, apartments, and access to recreational facilities 
because of their brown complexions or Middle Eastern names.
220
 
France’s failures resulted from social and economic policies that 
allowed public officials to fail to address the oppressive conditions of 
ethnic minorities.
221
 Second- and third-generation minority youths are 
still viewed as “immigrants” and are denied an equal opportunity to 
participate in French society.
222
 Years of police harassment, 
discrimination and social exclusion generated the acts of rebellion 
and the intense anger that was reflected in the 2005 riots.
223
 The 
unrest will not end until socio-economic inequalities and ethnic 
discrimination have been properly addressed.
224
  
The 2005 riots bear a remarkable resemblance to American race 
riots of the 1960s. In 1968, the President’s National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner 
Commission, released a report that identified racism as the primary 
cause of the surge of riots in several American cities in the late 
1960s.
225
 In particular, the report blamed the racist attitudes of white 
Americans for more than one hundred and fifty riots that took place 
between 1965 and 1968.
226
 After finding that segregation and poverty 
had created destructive ghetto environments in many cities, the 
Commission’s report concluded that “our nation is moving toward 
two societies, one black, and one white—separate and unequal.”227 
The riots in France were triggered by conditions comparable to those 
in the United States in the 1960s. 
 
 219. An Emperor, supra note 213. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Kerner Commission), 
(1968), available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf 
 226. Kerner Commission, supra note 225. 
 227. Id. 
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One cause of the riots that must be addressed to create lasting 
change consists of the continuous conflicts involving young 
banlieusards and the police. In the banlieues, the relationship 
between police and residents is rooted in distrust, suspicion, and 
conflict.
228
 For many banlieusards, the police represent an oppressive 
force that poses a constant threat to their well-being
229
 French 
politicians of both the right and the left have exacerbated the problem 
by expanding police powers to check identity papers, conduct 
searches, and detain citizens.
230
 Repeated identity checks, insults, 
provocation, and constant suspicion have become part of the daily 
routine for young people in these areas.
231
 The police are viewed as 
an opposing force that targets and discriminates against the local 
population rather than as the representatives of justice.
232
 A 
fundamental change in law enforcement methods is needed.  
VI. FRENCH ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
France has a full array of antidiscrimination laws, but they have 
been largely ineffective. This may be attributable to the nation’s 
official color-blind policies and its refusal to recognize race and 
ethnicity as social constructions that influence individuals’ 
interactions. Conflicts involving ethnic minorities are seen as an 
“immigrant” problem. This masks the ethnic discrimination inflicted 
on non-white residents and delegitimizes them as “foreigners” who 
are not part of French society. France’s refusal to collect data on race 
and ethnicity makes it difficult to measure the effects of 
discrimination, but researchers have found alternative means of 
collecting data.
233
 The primary antidiscrimination provision in French 
 
 228.  Kerner Commission, supra note 225; See also LA HAINE (May 31, 1995) (film 
portrayal of police treatment of banlieusards); see also Matt Feeney, La Haine: The Film that 
Predicted the French Riots, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/ 
dvdextras/2005/11/la_haine.html (discussing La Haine). 
 229. Moran, supra note 165, at 305. 
 230. Id. at 305; Haddad & Balz, supra note 212, at 27. 
 231. Moran, supra note 165, at 305. 
 232. Id.; see also Assiya Hamza, France Struggles to Address Racial Profiling by Police, 
FR. 24 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.france24.com/en/20131004-france-manuel-valls-racial-
profiling-police-francois-hollande-black-arab (“Rights groups are calling for a system to 
monitor the number of individuals police stop on the street, as well as why they are stopped.”). 
 233. France does not collect census or other data on the race or ethnicity of its citizens. 
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law is Article 225-1 of the Penal Code, which originated with the 
enactment of a 1972 law that prohibited racial discrimination.
234
 The 
1972 law modified the freedom of the press statute of 1881, which 
prohibited attacks in the press against racial and religious groups.
235
  
The 1972 statute strengthened the prohibitions against hate speech 
by criminalizing speech that provokes racial hatred.
236
 It also 
prohibits defamation; racial insults; and groups that provoke 
discrimination, hatred, or violence based on ethnicity, national origin, 
race, or religion.
237
 In the United States repugnant speech of this sort 
is protected by the First Amendment.
238
 The 1972 law also 
criminalized discrimination on the basis of a person’s origin, 
ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion.
239
 The statute “prohibit[s] 
public authorities and officials from refusing to provide a benefit or a 
right on these grounds.”240 “The statute prohibit[s] employers from 
firing or refusing to hire someone on the basis of” their origin, 
ethnicity, national origin, race, or religion.
241
 The French 
antidiscrimination laws have been expanded to include discrimination 
based on sex, pregnancy, familial status, physical appearance, family 
 
Erik Bleich, Race Policy in France, BROOKINGS (May 5, 2001), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/05/france-bleich#. A 1978 law banned the collection and 
storage of race-based data without the express consent of the interviewees or a waiver by a state 
committee. Id. Researchers use information on the number of foreigners and immigrants in 
France from the national census data, and second- and third-generation immigrant descendants 
has been estimated through survey data. David B. Oppenheimer, Why France Needs to Collect 
Data on Racial Identity . . . In A French Way, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 735, 742 
(2008); Rachel Holman, French Minority Advocates Call For Statistics on Diversity, FRANCE 
24 (July 11, 2011), available at http://m.france24.com/en/20110724-france-minority-leaders-
advocate-statistics-ethnic-diversity-discrimination-aneld/; Bruce Crumley, Should France Count 
Its Minority Population? TIME (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://content.time.com/time/ 
world/article/0,8599,1887106,00.html. 
 234. For a compilation of French anti-discrimination laws see SOPHI RECHT, ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN EU MEMBER STATES (Jan Niessen & Isabelle Chopin eds., 
2002), available at http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-b/ebr/02/ART13_France-en. 
pdf.  
 235. Julie C. Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295 (2007) [hereinafter Equal by Comparison]. 
 236. Suk, Equal by Comparison, supra note 235, at 312–18. 
 237. Id. at 302. 
 238. RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 239. Suk, Equal by Comparison, supra, note 235 at 302. 
  240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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name, state of health, handicap, genetic characteristics, sexual 
orientation, age, political opinions and union activities.
242
 
A 1982 labor law banned discrimination in hiring, firing, 
disciplining, training and promotion on the basis of origin, race, sex, 
familial status, political opinions, union activities, or religious 
convictions.
243
 A 1990 statute outlawed all racist and anti-Semitic 
acts.
244
 The 1990 law prohibits “the denial of the existence of crimes 
against humanity as defined by the 1945 Treaty of London.”245 The 
law also prohibits the denial of the Holocaust in “public places, in 
writing, print, drawings, inscriptions, paintings, emblems, images, or 
other speech or image sold or distributed or put on display.”246 
In 2004, the French Parliament enacted a statute that created the 
French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission, 
(Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité or 
“HALDE”), an administrative agency whose mission is to fight 
discrimination in France.
247
 Like the US Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission,
248
 HALDE cannot impose sanctions and 
“has limited investigatory powers.”249 “Its main function is to process 
individual claims, facilitate conciliation, and to assist in gathering 
evidence for criminal or civil actions.”250 
The French antidiscrimination laws allow for both criminal 
prosecution and civil actions for employment discrimination.
251
 A 
law passed in 2001 “modified the Labor Code’s antidiscrimination 
provision by adding a prohibition against indirect discrimination, and 
also by easing the burden of proof for plaintiffs in employment 
 
 242. Id. at 302–03. 
 243. Id. at 302. 
 244. Id. at 303. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 302–03. 
 247. Id. at 304. 
 248. Overview, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2014). 
 249. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil Criminal 
Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV., 1315, 1347 (2008) [hereinafter Procedural Path]. 
 250. Id. (referencing Loi 2004-1486 du 30 décembre 1004 [Law No. 2004-1486 of 
December 30, 2004], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], Dec. 31, 2004, p. 22567). 
 251. Suk, Equal by Comparison, supra note 235, at 304. 
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discrimination cases.”252 Most of the legal actions challenging 
employment discrimination have been criminal proceedings.
253
 The 
country’s reliance on criminal law has made it difficult to enforce 
antidiscrimination laws because of the high burden of proof and the 
difficulty of proving subjective intent.
254
 A conviction requires proof 
of discriminatory intent.
255
 Proof must show guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence and the heightened 
burden of proof in criminal proceedings makes it extremely difficult 
to prove discrimination.
256
 “There were three convictions in 1997, 
seven in 1999, sixteen in 2000, and twenty-nine in 2002.”257 
Professor Julie Suk has concluded that French antidiscrimination 
laws have been so ineffective, because:  
[the] formal prohibitions of discriminatory hiring have no 
deterrent effect in France. The reality is that employers clearly 
discriminate against candidates of North African descent, 
resulting in this population’s disproportionately high levels of 
unemployment. The persistence of discrimination in hiring, 
despite the formal legal prohibition of such conduct, is 
explained by barriers to the effective enforcement of this 
prohibition in French criminal and civil procedure . . . Most 
discrimination cases are brought in criminal proceedings, and 
convictions are very rare. Antidiscrimination law hardly deters 
even the most overt forms of discrimination.
258
 
 
 252. Id. at 303–04. 
 253. Suk, Procedural Path, supra note 249, at 1332. 
 254. Id. at 1332–34. 
 255. Id.  
 256. Id. 
 257. Suk, Equal by Comparison supra, note 235, at 323; ALEX G. HARGREAVES, HALF 
MEASURES: ANTI DISCRIMINATION POLICY IN FRANCE, IN RACE IN FRANCE: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 227 (Herrick Chapman & 
Laura L. Frader eds., 2004).  
 258. Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment 
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 105–06 (2007). On May 17, 2013, the French 
Parliament, supported by the ruling Socialist Party, adopted a bill to drop the word “race” from 
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As this Professor Suk’s observation and the discussion in 
following sections of this Article indicate, unlawful discrimination 
against ethnic minorities is not taken seriously in France. Overt 
discrimination is widespread and tolerated. Discrimination against 
ethnic minorities is obscured by the French belief that it is color-
blind, and by stereotypical attitudes about North and sub-Saharan 
Africans. Discrimination against these groups is not taken seriously 
as they are regarded as foreigners rather than French citizens entitled 
to equal protection of the laws. 
VII. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN FRANCE: THE “ETHNIC 
PENALTY” 
Ethnic minorities in France are exposed to persistent 
discrimination in the labor markets. As one researcher explained, “the 
statistics that have been collected are consistent with the inference 
that, by most measures, persons of North African descent are 
disadvantaged in employment relative to other residents of 
France.”259 During the post-World War II period, many French 
workers moved from industrial occupations to more desirable 
occupations in the service sector. Foreign workers replaced them.
260
 
When immigration was halted in 1975, many foreign workers were 
deported.
261
 The acting administration hoped that French nationals 
would take the jobs vacated by departing foreign workers, but this did 
not happen.
262
 
France’s immigrant labor force has traditionally been 
overrepresented in the industrial sector.
263
 In 1975, two-thirds of 
immigrant workers held industrial jobs.
264
 A significant proportion of 
them worked in the construction industry.
265
 In comparison, the 
majority of native-French workers were employed in the service 
sector. In the 1970s, native-French workers left construction jobs 
 
 259. HARGREAVES, supra note 2, at 48. 
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because the wages in the building trades were low compared to other 
sectors.
266
 The working conditions were unattractive with high 
accident rates, poor sanitation, and frequent layoffs.
267
 Foreign 
workers became concentrated in low-wage jobs in the construction 
industry
268
 and other sectors where there was high turnover.
269
 As 
jobs were eliminated by de-industrialization, immigrants bore the 
brunt of the job losses.
270
 From the mid-1970 on, immigrants were 
increasingly concentrated in low-wage, service sector jobs such as 
domestic work and jobs in hotels, cafes, and restaurants. 
271
 
These and other employment barriers experienced by immigrants 
and their children cannot be fully explained by low educational 
attainment or a lack of social networks. Researchers have labeled this 
labor market phenomenon as the “ethnic penalty.”272 Ethnic penalties 
are the net disadvantages experienced by ethnic minorities after 
controlling for their educational qualifications and experience in the 
labor market. Some of the explanations for ethnic disparities in the 
labor markets include: lack of social networks, “spatial mismatch,” 
proximity to jobs,
273
 and differences in individuals’ aspirations.274 
However, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, national origin, 
and religion was the most significant factor.
275
 
The results of the ethnic penalty are observable in various 
employment statistics and situations. The unemployment rates of 
immigrants are much higher than workers who do not have 
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 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
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 271. Id. at 44–48.  
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immigrant backgrounds.
276
 This is especially the case for workers 
from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
277
 The children of North African 
immigrants earn about 20 percent less than those of French natives.
278
 
Given the relatively low degree of earnings inequality in the French 
labor market as a whole, the ethnic disadvantage represents a large 
earnings penalty. The earnings disparities between second-generation 
immigrants from North Africa and other French citizens is largely 
attributable to the difficulties they experience in obtaining jobs.
279
 
Some of the barriers to the labor markets are caused by citizenship 
requirements for a number of public service jobs.
280
 Social class 
distinctions, geographic isolation, and ethnic prejudice also limit 
employment opportunities for immigrants.
281
 High levels of 
unemployment and overrepresentation in low-skilled jobs combine to 
lower the average earnings of immigrants as compared to French 
citizens.
282
 In addition to unemployment, these groups also 
experience more frequent layoffs. Several studies show the 
descendants of North African immigrants are particularly susceptible 
to unemployment as a result of their over-representation in low-
paying jobs that are subject to frequent layoffs.
283
  
One of the main difficulties ethnic minority workers face is 
obtaining entry-level positions that lead to higher-level positions. In 
2006, the Department of Research and Statistics (DARES) of the 
French Ministry of Labor commissioned the International Labor 
Office to study discriminatory employment practiced aimed at ethnic 
minorities in France. . . .
284
 The “matched pair” study compared the 
treatment of individuals with carefully matched attributes (age, 
 
 276. Klaus F. Zimmermann et al., Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of 
Ethnic Minorities, Institute for the Study of Labor Research Report No. 16, 25–26 (Oct. 8, 
2007), http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_16.pdf. 
 277. Zimmerman et al., supra note 275. 
 278. Arnaud Lefranc, Unequal Opportunities and Ethnic Origin: The Labor Market 
Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France, 53 (12) AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 
1851, 1874 (2010). 
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education, etc.) as they sought employment.
285
 Surveys to collect data 
were conducted in Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, Paris, and 
Strasbourg.
286
 The tests covered vacancy notices for low- and 
medium-skilled jobs in the hotel and restaurants sector; commerce; 
services to the public, communities, and enterprises; transportation; 
reception and secretarial services; health and social work; and 
building and public works.
287
 In one test, the applicants who tested 
the vacancy notices were young French men and women at the early 
stages of their careers, of either North African, sub-Saharan, or 
French origin.
288
 In another study, the International Labor Office sent 
two identical curricula vitae (“CV”s) to two hundred and fifty-eight 
employers, only bearing different candidate names. For example, one 
CV had a French first and last name; the other a North African name. 
The same address was given on both CVs. The first CV with the 
French name received seventy-five requests for an interview while 
the second received fourteen.
289
  
These results taken together with other research has consistently 
found that immigrant origin has a distinct effect on labor market 
participation.
290
 The disadvantages are reflected in a wide range of 
constraints that affect the chances of finding employment as well as 
the types of jobs available to immigrants.
291
 These studies show 
widespread and persistent discrimination against workers with North 
and sub-Saharan Africa backgrounds.
292
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VIII. ETHNIC MINORITY PERFORMANCE IN THE FRENCH 
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
The academic performance of children of North and sub-Saharan 
African immigrants is consistently lower than that of their French 
counterparts.
293
 The analysis in this section shows that teachers 
perceive ethnic minority students from immigrant backgrounds 
differently and less favorably than similarly situated students from 
French families. Teachers tend to focus on the classroom behavior of 
ethnic minority students rather than their academic potential. These 
documented attitudes can interfere with students’ academic progress.  
Under the French educational system, children from six to eleven 
years old are enrolled in elementary schools.
294
 These preparatory 
primary schools first develop linguistic abilities and provide civic 
education. The second curriculum cycle includes the study of foreign 
and regional languages, mathematics, arts, and physical education.
295
 
The final cycle adds literature, history, and geography to the 
curriculum, along with the experimental sciences and technology.
296
 
The next level in secondary schooling, college, enrolls students aged 
twelve through sixteen years without requiring an entrance 
examination.
297
 
Tracking students in upper secondary school is determined by the 
process d’orientation, which is decided by teachers and inspectors on 
the basis of students’ grades and the families’ preferences.298 Students 
may follow very different tracks. The lycée général et technologique 
is the most prestigious option. It represents the most direct path to 
university studies. After two years, students can be eligible for a 
general or technological baccalauréat (“BAC”).299 Another track is 
 
 293. Hector Cebolla Boado, Primary and Secondary Effects In the Explanation of 
Disadvantage in Education: The Children of Immigrant Families in France, 32 BRIT. J. SOC. 
EDUC. 407, 412 (May 2011); Yaël Brinbaum & Hector Cebolla-Boado, The School Careers of 
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the lycée proffesionel, which, after two years, provides the brevet 
d’études proffesionels (BEP).300 The lycée proffesionel differs from 
the lycée general et technologique in that one prepares students for 
university studies while the other is vocational, preparing students to 
enter the workforce . . . . The other vocational credential is the 
certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (“CAP”), which prepares the 
students for a specific occupation.
301
 Most French families believe 
that the baccalauréat is the minimum educational level their children 
should obtain.
302
 People of North African descent are more likely to 
prefer the preparation for university track for their children.
303
 They 
perceive educational attainment at the highest-level as a way to 
achieve upward mobility.
304
  
However, a persistent achievement gap exists between French 
students and those with immigrant origins. In 2011, Professor Hector 
Boado published an article that examined the educational outcomes 
of immigrant students in French schools.
305
 He concluded that 
students with immigrant origins were disadvantaged in the transition 
from lower to upper secondary school.
306
 A 1989 study showed 65.1 
percent of the French students went on to the general (upper) track, 
but only 51.7 percent of foreigners did so.
307
 Only 56.4 percent of 
foreign-born children with two foreign-born parents were invited to 
proceed to the Séconde général et technologique.
308
 The French-born 
children with two foreign-born parents did so in 52.2 percent of the 
cases. In comparison, 65.5 percent of the children of French parents 
entered this track.
309
 Professors Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado’s study 
examined immigrant families from Portugal and North Africa and 
found that immigrant families had higher educational expectations 
about their children’s education than French working-class 
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 301. Id. 
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families.
310
 North African families were more likely to prefer longer 
studies in general or more academic tracks.
311
 However, the children 
of immigrant families performed at levels lower than national 
averages at the secondary education level.
312
 The researchers 
suggested the disparities were caused by the lower educational 
attainment levels of immigrant parents as compared to French 
families.
313
 The children of immigrant families are more likely to 
enter the general and technological tracks that can lead to university 
studies, but their success is limited as they tend to perform at lower 
levels than other students.
314
  
In 1982, a French version of affirmative action was established by 
the creation of Zones d’Education Prioritaires (“ZEP”), in which 
additional resources were given to public schools in banlieues to 
provide students with enhanced opportunities for academic 
success.
315
 When President Jacques Chirac was re-elected in 2002, 
the government eliminated this and other policies implemented from 
1997 to 2002 by the Socialist Party government of Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin.
316
 This eliminated the special programs that were put 
in place under the previous administration. 
Researchers have attempted to determine the causes of immigrant 
students’ underperformance. The book, Muslim Girls and the Other 
France: Race, Identity Politics and Social Exclusion, contains a 
detailed study of socioeconomic exclusion in France, particularly in 
its educational system.
317
 The book is the product of an ethnography 
conducted by Professor Tricia Keaton in Pantin, the Département of 
Seine-St-Denis, a Paris suburb.
318
 Keaton critiqued the French 
education system’s ideological function for its exclusion of 
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Francophone perspectives.
319
 The educational curriculum also tends 
to overlook the nation’s history of colonization and slavery.  
Keaton described the obstacles the Muslim girls in her study 
encountered at school.
320
 The girls were highly motivated and hoped 
to obtain baccalauréat degrees.
321
 Keaton described the ways in 
which the girls attempted to navigate male supremacist attitudes at 
school, the constraints imposed by constant policing by their families 
(Muslim girls cannot go out without a chaperone), and religious 
intolerance at school.
322
 The problems at school included the 
teachers’ misunderstanding of the reasons underlying girls’ academic 
underperformance.
323
 Lower academic performance was not so much 
a function of inadequate written expression skills (as teachers 
assumed) as it was the result of a lack of cultural resonance for the 
students. Keaton found that additional problems resulted from 
inadequate study conditions at home, which were created by 
overcrowding, heavy domestic responsibilities, and parents’ 
objections to certain aspects of curricula (such as sex education).
324
 
The workloads, inadequate training, and insufficient support for 
teachers also contributed to students’ academic problems.325 
Other research observations are similar to Keaton’s findings. 
Since the 1970s, studies have shown how teachers perceive 
immigrant and French students differently.
326
 In one study, teachers 
were asked to judge children on the basis of their physical 
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appearance, ways of dressing and talking, politeness, and other 
personal characteristics.
327
 Children of foreign laborers were 
consistently considered to be the least appealing, followed by 
children of French working-class families.
328
 French children from 
middle- and upper-class families were described as the most 
attractive by the majority of teachers.
329
  
In another study that examined teachers’ comments about 
different students, researchers determined that teachers evaluated 
French students on their academic performance and intellectual 
potential. However, the teachers tended to focus on the classroom 
behaviors of foreign students, particularly those of North African 
origin.
330
 Another study involving interactions among teachers and 
North African students showed that teachers often judged the 
students on the basis of their behavior and gestures describing the 
students as insolent, voluble, curious, secretive, susceptible, and 
proud.
331
 According to other research, teachers described North 
African girls as arrogant.
332
  
The teachers’ focus on behavior, gestures, and attitudes reveals 
the educational system’s unconscious bias against immigrant-
population students. As Pierre Bourdieu explained in his study of the 
French educational system, success in school entails a wide range of 
cultural behaviors, including non-academic attributes such as 
comportment, dress, and accent.
333
 Children from middle-class 
families have learned this behavior, as have their teachers. Children 
from working-class backgrounds have not. Middle-class students’ 
speech, dress, and mannerisms fit the expectations of their teachers. 
Students from lower income families are often seen as “difficult” and 
presenting “challenges.”334 However, both groups behave in 
accordance with the norms of their communities.  
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What is seen as the “natural” ability of affluent students is, in 
reality, the product of their parents’ social and economic status.335 
Privileged children are inculcated with speech patterns, styles of 
dress, and comportment that facilitate their success in the educational 
system. Their affluent backgrounds, conditioning, and experiences 
equip them with the attributes needed to reproduce their parents’ 
social position. Too often, teachers erroneously interpret these class-
based advantages as a reflection of “hard work” or “innate” ability.336 
The teachers’ assumptions and stereotypes about students from 
immigrant families create obstacles to learning that other, more 
privileged students do not encounter. 
IX. THE HEADSCARF AND BURQA BANS  
The conflicts involving ethnic minorities in France have been 
highlighted by the country’s controversial decisions to ban 
headscarves in schools and burqas in public places. These actions are 
skirmishes in France’s culture war against Islam. Proponents of the 
headscarf and burqa bans justify those laws with the doctrine of 
laïcité (“secularism”), which can be traced back to the French 
Revolution. France’s history of conflict with the Catholic Church that 
led to an official policy of secularism.
337
  
The roots of this break with the Catholic Church can be traced 
back to the Enlightenment period, a time from approximately 1700 to 
1800 that was characterized by dramatic revolutions in science, 
philosophy, society, and politics.
338
 During this period, wealthy 
members of the French bourgeoisie hoped to gain more significant 
positions in France’s aristocratic society.339 Under the “Ancien 
Régime” (old order), the political and social system that existed in 
France before the French Revolution, the Catholic Church was the 
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 337. C.M.A. McCauliff, Dreyfus, La Cite and the Burqua, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 117 
(2012). 
 338. William Bristow, Enlightenment, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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largest single landowner in France.
340
 There was a great deal of 
resentment of the privileges that were enjoyed by the clergy and 
aristocracy. The middle class—consisting of professionals, 
manufacturers, and their allies—began to demand a role in French 
society consistent with their economic status.
341
 French aristocrats 
and lesser royals, as well as the Catholic Church, rebuffed the middle 
class no matter how wealthy they were.
342
  
The concepts of liberte, egalite, and fraternite (“liberty, equality, 
and fraternity”) considerably diminished the Catholic Church’s 
power and influence during the French Revolution.
343
 Anti-clerical 
campaigns included the deportation and execution of clergy, the 
closing of churches, the destruction of religious monuments, and the 
outlawing of public and private worship and religious education.
344
 In 
1789, the Constituent Assembly nationalized church property.
345
 The 
following year, the Assembly enacted the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy, which required all priests to swear an oath to uphold the 
Constitution.
346
 These requirements created a sharp divide between 
Catholic priests who accepted the Civil Constitution and those who 
did not.  
In 1801, Napoleon attempted to heal the division when he 
negotiated a concordat with the Catholic Church that provided for the 
collaborative appointment of bishops: the state nominated bishops 
and the pope appointed nominees.
347
 Additionally, priests became 
civil servants paid by the state. The Church also relinquished its 
claims to recover property nationalized in the Revolution and ceded 
control over marriage, family law, and education to the state with the 
enactment of the Civil Code of 1804.
348
 
The French educational system was completely secularized in the 
late nineteenth century with the enactment of the “Ferry Laws” in the 
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 123–25; T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicite: A Comparison of the 
United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 433–39 (2004). 
 344. C.M.A. McCauliff, supra note 337, at 123–25. 
 345. Id. at 123. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 46:185 
 
 
1880s.
349
 As Joan Wallace Scott observed in The Politics of the Veil, 
the principles of secularity in schools “made primary education a 
requirement for boys and girls and . . . effectively banished from the 
classroom religion as a subject and priests and nuns as teachers.”350 
The French government formally ended relations with the Catholic 
Church in 1905 when it adopted a law on the separation of church 
and state, codifying the principle of laïcité.
351
 
What became known as l’affaire du foulard (the headscarf affair) 
began in October 1989, when the principal of Gabriel-Havez College, 
a Muslim-majority middle school in the Parisian suburb of Creil, 
suspended three Muslim schoolgirls of North African descent for 
wearing headscarves.
352
 The Creil incident generated national 
attention.
353
 The headmaster’s decision was later reversed, but the 
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Education Minister, Lionel Jospin, submitted a request to the Conseil 
d’Etat for an advisory opinion on the matter.354  
The Conseil held that the principle of secularity and the protection 
of freedom of religion in France could be reconciled. Students in 
public schools had a right to religious expression as long as their 
actions did not interfere with the other student’s right to religious 
freedom. However, schools are permitted to sanction students when 
their religious expression threatens public health, security, or order.
355
 
The Conseil’s decision stated: 
In schools, the wearing by students of signs by which they 
intend to manifest their religious affiliation is not by itself 
incompatible with the principle of secularism, insofar as it 
constitutes the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom 
of manifestation of religious beliefs, but . . . this freedom 
would not allow students to sport signs of religious affiliation 
that, due to their nature, the conditions in which they are worn 
individually or  collectively, or their ostentatious character or 
display as a protest, would constitute an act of pressure, 
provocation, proselytism or propaganda, or would jeopardize 
the dignity or freedom of the student or of other members of 
the school community, would compromise their health or 
safety, or would perturb the conduct of teaching activities or 
the educational role of the teachers, or would disturb order in 
the establishment or the normal operation of public service.
356
 
This is a questionable conclusion as there was no concrete evidence 
that wearing scarves interfered with classroom instruction or 
disrupted the operation of the schools. Many of the Conseil’s 
conclusions were speculative. A more credible explanation for the 
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parliament. These courts serve appellate functions that the Supreme Court performs in the 
United States. Elisa T. Beller, The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’État on the Role of Religion 
and Culture in French Society, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 581, 584 (2004). 
 355. BRONWYN WINTER, HIJAB & THE REPUBLIC: UNCOVERING THE FRENCH HEADSCARF 
DEBATE 168 (2009). 
 356. Id. at 138; see also Weil, supra note 353, at 2700. 
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ban was the display of an Islamic religious symbol that offended 
school officials. This underscores the substantial differences between 
the American and French views of freedom of expression and 
religion. A veil ban would not be permitted in the United States under 
the First Amendment.
357
 
In 1997, following the election of a Socialist Party majority in the 
Parliament, the Education Minister issued an order prohibiting 
ostentatious religious symbols in public schools. Two thousand 
Muslim students refused to comply with the order. This defiance 
resulted in the presentation of forty-nine cases to the Conseil d’Etat, 
forty-one of which were concluded with decisions in favor of the 
Muslim students.
358
 Nevertheless, the public controversy 
continued.
359
  
In 2003, President Chirac announced that Bernard Stasi, the 
ombudsman of the French Republic, would lead a new executive 
commission to conduct a study of French secularism and the 
headscarf controversy.
360
 The Stasi Commission was composed of 
twenty members, most of whom were distinguished intellectuals, 
politicians, and political appointees.
361
 Several members of the 
Commission were members of religious minority groups.
362
 On 
December 11, 2003, the Stasi Commission issued a report that 
recommended banning the wearing of ostentatious religious 
symbols—including skullcaps, headscarves, and crosses—in public 
schools.
363
 President Chirac agreed that wearing headscarves was “an 
 
 357. See infra Part X for discussion of the freedom of religion and expression under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution are discussed.  
 358. Wiles, supra note 10, at 701–02; Nusrat Choudry, From the Stasi Commission to the 
European Court of Human Rights: L’Affaire du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the 
Rights of Muslim Girls, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 199, 229 (2007). 
 359. See, e.g., Keaton, Arrogant Assimilationism, supra note 253, at 417 (2005); Youssef 
M. Ibrahim, Arab Girls’ Veils at Issue in France, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1989, at L5, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/12/world/arab-girls-veils-at-issue-in-france.html; Talal 
Asad, French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair”, 8 THE HEDGEHOG REV. 93, 93 (2006). 
 360. Choudry, supra note 358, at 231–32. 
 361. Id.  
 362. Id. at 232. 
 363. Commission De Reflexion Sur L’application Du Principe de Laicite Dans la 
Republique, Rapport Au President De La Republique (2004), translated in Robert O’Brien, The 
Report of the Committee of Reflection on the Application of the Principle of Secularity in the 
Republic (2005). 
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act of aggression”364 and recommended a ban on headscarves in 
public schools and other ostentatious displays of religious faith.
365
  
On February 10, 2004, the French lower house of Parliament 
passed a bill banning headscarves by a vote of four hundred and 
ninety-four to thirty-six.
366
 On March 3, 2004, the French Senate 
approved the bill by a vote of two hundred and sevety-six to twenty 
and President Chirac signed the bill into law on March 15, 2004 (“the 
Act”).367 The Act prohibits the wearing of “ostentatious religious 
symbols” in elementary, secondary, and high schools funded by the 
state. Approximately 70 percent of the French public expressed 
strong support for the Act in opinion polls. Almost half the Muslim 
population polled supported the law, and about half of the Muslim 
supporters were women.
368
 
The veil controversy subsequently moved from schools to the 
streets.
369
 An October 14, 2010, a Mail Online article reported that:  
A female lawyer allegedly ripped another woman’s burka off 
in a clothes shop—and told her to ‘clear off to your own 
country’. The 26-year-old Muslim convert said the 60-year-old 
lawyer made ‘snide remarks’ about her Islamic veil. An 
argument followed during which the older woman is said to 
have ripped the veil off, before the Muslim woman allegedly 
punched her. Both women were arrested. The row happened in 
Trignac, near Nantes, France, as the country prepares to 
introduce a ban on the burka. A police officer said: ‘The 
lawyer said she was not happy seeing a fellow shopper wearing 
a veil and wanted the ban introduced as soon as possible. ‘At 
one point the lawyer, who was out  with her daughter, is said 
to have likened the Muslim woman to Belphegor—a horror 
demon character well known to French television viewers. The 
 
 364. Ziegler, supra note 353, at 240. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Weil, supra note 353, at 2701. 
 367. Id. at 2699. 
 368. The War of the Headscarves, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/2404691. 
 369. Peter Allen, Burka rage as female lawyer rips veil off Muslim woman in French 
clothes shop, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1279349/ 
Burka-rage-female-lawyer-rips-veil-Muslim-woman-French-clothes-store.html. 
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lawyer’s use of the name ‘Belphegor’ was particularly 
inflammatory, said police, because the demon was portrayed 
by classical writers as ‘Hell’s ambassador to France’ . . . Police 
said the incident was still being investigated, and that charges 
could follow.
370
  
This conflict was an example of the strong feelings of many French 
citizens who were offended by Islamic clothing. On June 22, 2009, 
President Sarkozy delivered a speech in which he expressed his 
disapproval of Muslim burqas saying they were a violation of “the 
French [R]epublic’s idea of women’s dignity.”371 He also said “[t]he 
burka is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not 
be welcome on the territory of the French republic”372 The French 
Parliament subsequently established a commission to investigate the 
practice of Muslim women in wearing burqas.
373
 After a five-month 
study, the commission issued a report stating that wearing full veils 
challenged the secular values of the French Republic and condemned 
what it viewed as an excessive display of religious symbols in public 
places.
374
  
On July 13, 2010, the French lower house of Parliament passed a 
ban on face covering veils that public.
375
 On September 14, 2010, the 
French Senate followed the lower house’s lead and approved the 
measure.
376
 When the law was challenged, the French Constitutional 
Council concluded that it did not have a disproportionate impact on 
Muslim women or prevent their free exercise of religion. It ruled that 
“the law conforms to the Constitution.”377 This conclusion was 
 
 370. Id. 
 371. Davis, Lifting the Veil, supra note 353, at 118. 
 372. Sarkozy speaks out against burka, BBC NEWS (June 22, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/europe/8112821.stm. 
 373. Tony Cross, France’s burka bill—background to a bitter debate, RFI (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20100526-sarkozy-and-burka; Steven Erlanger, France 
Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12france.html; see also Davis, supra note 371. 
 374. Davis, Lifting the Veil, supra note 353 (internal citations omitted). 
 375. Id. at 118–19. 
 376. Id. at 119. 
 377. French burqa ban clears last legal obstacle, CNN World (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www. 
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/07/france.burqa.ban/; Adam Scott Kunz, Note, Public 
Exposure: Of Burqas, Secularism, and France’s Violation of European Law, 44 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 79, 79–80 (212). 
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factually inaccurate as Muslim women were affected more than any 
other group.
378
 Prohibiting headscarves and veils will not resolve that 
nation’s conflicts with ethnic minorities. The conditions in which 
these groups reside, their mistreatment in schools, the discriminatory 
barriers to employment, and the harassment of young banlieuesards 
are issues that must be addressed.  
X. RELIGIOUS DRESS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
France’s headscarf ban would be unconstitutional in America 
because it would violate Muslim women’s “hybrid right” of religious 
exercise coupled with religious expression.
379
 The United States 
Supreme Court has consistently held that public school students have 
constitutionally protected rights to freedom of speech and religious 
expression.
380
 In the seminal case concerning students’ speech rights, 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
381
 
students wore black armbands on their sleeves to show their 
opposition to the Vietnam War. The students were suspended and not 
allowed to return to school as long as they wore the armbands. Ruling 
in the students’ favor, the Supreme Court held that students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”382 In other cases, the Court has held that a 
school cannot censor student expression because of its religious 
content unless the school can demonstrate that the speech causes a 
material disruption in the school’s normal operations, violates the 
rights of others, is vulgar, or advocates unlawful conduct.
383
 
 
 378. Human Rights Watch, France: Face Veil Undermines Rights, July 3, 2014 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/03/france-face-veil-ruling-undermines-rights. 
 379. See generally United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, 
Hearn v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist. 020, No. CIV 03-598-S (E.D. Okla. May 6, 2004), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/hearnokbrief.pdf.  
 380. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 381. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 382. Id. at 506. 
 383. See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393; Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. 260; and Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675. 
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Moreover, school officials “cannot suppress expressions of feelings 
with which they do not wish to contend”384 or “prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”385  
These principles were tested when a Southern California school 
district allowed Sikh students to carry dagger-like blades called a 
kirpan. The kirpan is one of five sacred articles that baptized Sikhs 
must wear. The students in the Jurupa Unified School District were 
allowed to wear the approximately 2-inch knives at school after their 
parents agreed to solder them or sew them into the sheaths so they 
could not be used as weapons.
386
  
In another school district, the dress code was interpreted to bar 
gang-related apparel, but it did not define “gang-related.” The 
students were told that they could not wear Catholic rosaries because 
the school had identified rosaries as gang-related apparel. Students 
sued the school in Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School 
District,
387
 claiming the dress code infringed upon their free exercise 
rights. To prevail in Chalifoux, the school district was obligated to 
produce evidence showing that wearing religious garb would 
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or “impinge 
upon the rights of other students.” The court found that not only did 
the school district fail to satisfy its burden, but the rosaries were worn 
for bona fide religious purposes. The ban as applied did not “bear 
more than a reasonable relation” to regulating gang activity and 
placed an “undue burden” on the students.388 
A dispute involving Islamic headscarves arose when Nashala 
Hearn, an eleven year-old sixth-grade student, was ordered to remove 
 
 384. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
 385. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 386. Sanjeev Singh, Sikhs Allowed to Carry Daggers at Calif. School, WORLD WIDE 
RELIGIOUS NEWS (Nov. 5, 2012), http://wwrn.org/articles/38513/?&place=north-america& 
section=sikhism. 
 387. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 663 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 388. See generally Discrimination Against Muslim Women, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/pdfs/womensrights/discriminationagainstmuslimwomen.pdf (last visited Sept. 
10, 2014); Presumption of Guilt: The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States, 
COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS (2007), http://cairunmasked.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/02/2007-Civil-Rights-Report.pdf. 
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her hijab.
389
 Hearn continued to wear a hijab and was suspended 
twice for doing so. The family appealed but the suspensions, were 
upheld by the school district.
390
 Hearn’s parents filed suit and 
presented evidence that showed the district had granted exceptions to 
the ban on head coverings for costumes worn during school plays. 
During legal proceedings, the United States Justice Department 
intervened on Hearn’s behalf and argued the district violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
391
 The United 
States argued that 
the policy is subject to ad hoc exceptions for various secular 
head coverings and thus is not generally applicable; the policy 
burdens Nashala’s “hybrid right” of religious exercise coupled 
with religious expression; and the policy has been enforced 
against Nashala on a discriminatory basis because of her 
particular religious faith, and thus is not religion-neutral.
392
  
The Department of Justice settled the lawsuit under a consent 
agreement in which the school district allowed Hearn to wear 
headscarves and agreed to revise its dress code to accommodate 
religious exceptions.
393
 
These American examples show that France’s fear of Muslim 
attire is overblown. The most likely reason for France’s ban on 
 
 389. Terry Frieden, U.S. to defend Muslim girl wearing scarf in school,  
CNN (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/30/us.school.headscarves/; Jesse 
Lee, Nashala’s Story, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2009, 3:20 PM), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/blog/2009/06/04/nashalas-story. 
 390. Frieden, supra note 389. 
 391. The Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to prevent states from applying dress 
codes in a discriminatory manner. For discussions of headscarves and the First Amendment, see 
Cassandra M. Vogel, Note, An Unveiling: Exploring the Constitutionality of a Ban on Face 
Coverings in Public Schools, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 741 (2013); Christina A. Baker, French 
Headscarves and the U.S. Constitution: Parents, Children and Free Exercise of Religion, 13 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 341, 354 (2007); Oriana Mazza, The Right to Wear Headscarves and 
Other Religious Symbols in French, Turkish and American Schools: How the Government 
Draws a Veil on Free Expression of Faith, 48 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 303, 336–37, 340 (2009). 
 392. United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 379, at 
19. 
 393. Justice Department Reaches Settlement Agreement with Oklahoma School District in 
Muslim Student Headscarf Case, DOJ (May 19, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/ 
May/04_crt_343.htm. 
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headscarves and burqas is the negative reaction by many French 
citizens to the growing Muslim population in that country. To many 
French citizens, Islamic clothing represents a rejection of French 
tradition of assimilation. The American cases show that females 
wearing headscarves in schools do not interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of public schools or impinge 
on the rights of other students. Headscarves are worn for bona fide 
religious purposes. The current French ban on headscarves imposes 
an undue burden on Muslim female students’ of what in America 
would be the “hybrid right” of religious exercise and religious 
expression. The same reasoning should be extended to allow the 
wearing of burqas in public.
394
  
 
XI. Scarves, Veils, Islam and French Civilization 
 
The controversy concerning conflicts with “immigrants” is based 
on growing number of Muslims in France and their desire to observe 
their religious customs. Many French citizens fear that Muslims will 
undermine their values and traditions. The Islamic veil is perceived 
as a potent symbol of that threat. The French government apparently 
believes Islamic head coverings jeopardize the health and safety of 
French citizens and banning them will eliminate that threat. These 
fears are exaggerated.  
French law-makers should recognize that the question of whether 
Islamic tenets require all Muslim women to wear headscarves is the 
subject of differing interpretations. Islamic scholars, feminist 
scholars, and others continue to debate the question of whether 
 
 394. Adrien Katherine Wing, International Law, Secularism, and the Islamic World, 24 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 407, 418–20 (2009). It is important to note that France is not unique. 
“Islamophobia” persists at high levels in the United States. The attitude consists of an 
exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility perpetuated by negative stereotypes and results in bias, 
discrimination, and marginalization of Muslims. Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim 
Sentiment in the West, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-
understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx#1 (last visited Sept. 9, 2014); see also FBI: 
Bias Crimes Against Muslims Remain at High Levels, INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Spring 2013), 
http://www.splcenter.org/home/2012/spring/fbi-bias-crimes-against-muslims-remain-at-high-
levels (Hate crimes against perceived Muslims have persisted at high levels). 
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headscarves are compulsory.
395
 The word hijab, refers to the practice 
of modest dress for men and women. It can be traced to four verses in 
the Qur’an.396 Verse 24.31 states, for example:  
And tell the believing women to reduce [some] of their vision 
and guard their private parts and not expose their adornment 
except that which [necessarily] appears thereof and to wrap [a 
portion of] their headcovers over their chests and not expose 
their adornment except to their husbands, their fathers, their 
husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their 
brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their women, 
that which their  right hands possess, or those male attendants 
having no physical desire, or children who are not yet aware of 
the private aspects of women. And let them not stamp their feet 
to make known what they conceal of their adornment. And 
turn to Allah in repentance, all of you, O believers, that you 
might succeed.
397
 
Similarly, Verse 33.59 states, “O Prophet, tell your wives and your 
daughters and the women of the believers to bring down over 
themselves [part] of their outer garments. That is more suitable that 
they will be known and not be abused.”398 Many women wear 
headscarves based on their interpretation of the Qur’an and consider 
the practice to be an important symbol of their religious values and 
Islamic identity. 
The critical, but unresolved question is whether scarves and 
burqas are worn as voluntary expressions of Islamic culture and faith 
or whether they are coerced by the expectations of a paternalistic 
society that demeans and devalues women. It would be problematic if 
the coverings are worn as a result of coercion by Islamic men since 
that would diminish the status and equality rights of women. One 
way to approach this debate is through the lens of Critical Race 
 
 395. Religions-Islam: Niqab, BBC (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ 
religions/islam/beliefs/ niqab_1.shtml. The four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence interpret 
the Qu’ran as not requiring women to wear headscarves or veils. Id.  
 396. These four verses are 24:30-31, 24:60, 33:59, and 33:53. QURAN.COM, http://quran. 
com/24 (last visited Sept. 9, 2014); Wiles, supra note 10, at 717. 
 397. QURAN.COM, supra note 396. 
 398. Id. 
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Feminism.
399
 Mainstream feminism has not paid adequate attention to 
the roles of white men and women in the oppression of women of 
color.
400
 Though it incorporates some elements of feminist 
jurisprudence, Critical Race Feminism’s analytical perspective is 
primarily concerned with the oppression of women of color.
401
 It 
addresses, among other things, the intersectionality of discrimination 
against nonwhite women, which can differ from discrimination 
experienced by white women or black men.
402
  
The headscarf controversy is an example of this phenomenon. 
Muslim men in France have not been subjected to the stigmatizing 
and demeaning veil laws that are written in neutral terms but 
disproportionately impact Muslim women. White, non-Muslim 
women are not affected. The burden is borne mainly by Islamic 
women of color. Ethnicity, gender, national origin, and religion 
intersect to impose a category of discrimination unique to non-white, 
Muslim women in France. The laws’ effect is more burdensome than 
discrimination based only on ethnic, gender, national origin, or 
religious considerations. Furthermore, there are no compelling 
justifications for the headscarf and veil laws. They are not reasonably 
related to any legitimate governmental interest. Headscarves and 
burqas do not pose a threat to safety or stability in France. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that veils are signs of “subservience,”403 they do 
not pose “a clear and present danger” to French society that would 
justify bans on religious customs and expressions.
404
  
Many Western feminists contend that Islamic headscarves 
undermine gender equality.
405
 Headscarves, they argue, reflect 
practices developed to maintain male dominance.
406
 Even if women 
 
 399. Wing, supra note 394, at 412. 
 400. Id. at 413. 
 401. Id. at 412. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Doreen Carvajal, Sarkozy Backs Drive to Eliminate the Burqa, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/world/europe/23france.html; Angelique Chrisafis, 
Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not welcome in France, THE GUARDIAN (June 22, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/22/islamic-veils-sarkozy-speech-france. 
 404. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (holding speech cannot be penalized 
unless it presents a clear and present danger to public safety). 
 405. The arguments are evaluated in Wiles, supra note 10, at 719–22. 
 406. Bennoune, supra note 353, at 388–91. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  Color-blind Racism in France 241 
 
 
believe they want to wear headscarves, it is derived from a “false 
consciousness” as their self-perception and social roles are inculcated 
by socialization in a highly paternalistic culture.
407
 In this context, 
scarves would be symbols of sexist oppression.
408
 They can foster 
religious extremism and create divisions among Muslim women.
409
 
Commenting on the question of headscarves in schools, scholars 
have argued that the educational environment should provide female 
students a means of escape from male domination rather than 
reproduce the patriarchy experienced at home.
410
 They also contend 
that headscarves may inhibit Muslim schoolgirls’ capacity to learn 
and integrate into mainstream French culture.
411
 In opposition to this 
view, some Muslim feminists associate headscarf banning with 
colonialist policies of coerced cultural assimilation through 
prohibitions on indigenous cultural symbols, such as modes of 
dress.
412
 
There are some who disagree with these views. Many Muslim 
women wear scarves and veils to freely express religious convictions 
and beliefs, display modesty in dress, comply with family values, or 
protect themselves from sexual harassment.
413
 Some feminist scholars 
consider Western feminists’ critiques of headscarf wearing to be 
essentialist value judgments reflecting stereotypical views of Muslim 
women. This interpretation presumes that Western values have a 
universal validity rather than being social, ideological, or intellectual 
 
 407. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 115 
(1989); see generally Susanna Mancini, Patriarchy as the Exclusive Domain of the Other: The 
Veil Controversy, False Projection and Cultural Racism, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 411, 418–22 
(2012). ANASTASIA VAKULENKO, ISLAMIC VEILING IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 109 (2012) 
(discussing the views of Catherine McKinnon and Andrea Dworkin).  
 408. MacKinnon, supra, note 407 
 409. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the 
Veil?, Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 771–73 
(2006); Karima Bennoune, The Law of the Republic versus the “Law of the Brothers”: A Story 
of France’s Law Banning Religious Symbols in Public Schools, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
STORIES, 155 (Deena Hurwitz, Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Douglas B. Ford eds., 2009); see 
genrally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003). 
 410. Keaton, Arrogant Assimilationism, supra note 353. 
 411. Wiles, supra note 10, at 719–22. 
 412. See Alia Al-Saji, The Racialization of Muslim Veils: A Philosophical Analysis, 38(8) 
PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM 875, 886 (2010); FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM 
(1965). 
 413. Wing & Smith, supra note 409. 
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constructs. This does not recognize the diversity of cultural practices 
within Islam.
414
 Some Western feminists argue that Western 
scholarship on Eastern cultures is produced by an Orientalist 
framework that is distorted by unconscious cultural biases.
415
 These 
scholars believe that reserve and restraint in dress are not always 
coerced. Rather than reflecting a passive submission to the Islamic 
community, the headscarf can express an active interest in religious 
scripture.
416
 For many, wearing scarves is a gesture that reaffirms a 
commitment to Islamic morality and identity.
417
 Scholars also argue 
that a headscarf allows the wearer to interact with society without 
feeling that she is being perceived as a sexual object.
418
 In Western 
countries, the headscarf can be a politically empowering means of 
expressing disagreement with Western culture and its sexualization of 
women.
419
 For many Muslim women, headscarves function as a 
means of cultural identification that is more important than scholarly 
concerns about its gender implications.
420
 
The ways in which Muslim women understand the wearing of 
headscarves present only a few of the intricate, multilayered, and 
nuanced questions that scholars will continue to debate. However, it 
is not necessary to resolve the debate to determine that the French 
veil laws are problematic. The French government should not have 
interfered with the religious practices of Muslim women simply 
because those practices are perceived to violate the French 
Republic’s “idea of women’s dignity.” The motives for wearing 
headscarves and burqas vary widely among individual women, 
ranging from voluntary religious expression, to family obligation, to 
bold political statement. Whatever the motivation may be for wearing 
burqas or headscarves, a democratic nation such as France should not 
impose itself as the arbiter of those decisions. Islamic women should 
have the freedom and autonomy to make individual choices about 
their modes of dress without interference from others. 
 
 414. Wiles, supra note 10, at 719–22. 
 415. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 37. 
 416. Wiles, supra note 10, at 719–22. 
 417. Choudry, supra note 358, at 204. 
 418. Wiles, supra note 10, at 719–22. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a 2014 New York Times commentary, an American professor 
living in Paris recounted an eye-opening experience into French 
attitudes about race. A taxi driver told the professor as they passed 
through a black neighborhood, “I hope you got your shots. You don’t 
need to go to Africa anymore to get a tropical disease.”421 Casual 
comments like this confirm that the immigration debate is as much 
about race and ethnicity as it is about national origin. The labeling of 
second- and third-generation Maghrebis as “immigrants” shows that 
they are not considered French, even though they were born there and 
are French citizens. Since the mid-1970s, immigration has been an 
emotionally charged issue in French elections with politicians 
seeking elective offices exploiting the issue for political gain.  
Immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa have been 
crowded into public housing in banlieues located along the 
perimeters of French cities. They contain high concentrations of low-
income families. Crime is high and the schools are often substandard. 
Young men are the targets of relentless police harassment. Tensions 
between police and banlieuesards have resulted in countless minor 
disturbances and a number of major riots.  
The children of immigrants perform at a lower academic level 
than those of native-French schoolchildren. Teachers often assume 
that the children of immigrants cannot perform at an adequate 
academic level and view such students as disruptive. Surveys show 
that teachers focus on the behaviors of immigrant students rather than 
their academic ability. 
Ethnic minorities also suffer from discrimination in the labor 
markets. They are relegated into the lowest paying and least desirable 
occupations, if they are hired at all. The “ethnic penalty” results in 
high levels of unemployment among ethnic minorities. Though 
several antidiscrimination laws prohibit employment discrimination, 
studies have shown that the laws are not very effective in protecting 
ethnic minorities from discriminatory practices. 
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To many French citizens, headscarves and burqas represent an 
existential challenge to French identity. In reality, however, scarves 
have never posed any real threat to the safety or stability of France. 
Communalism, the apparent rejection of French Republicanism, and 
the mistreatment of some Muslim women by their male relatives 
provided a convenient excuse to outlaw religious dress in public 
spaces. In banishing head coverings from schools and public spaces, 
France effectively attempted to isolate, denigrate, and marginalize 
Islamic immigrants. The French approach to policymaking may be 
cast in race neutral terms, but it has a disproportionate impact on 
Muslim women. The French government knew this would be the 
effect of the laws. They are thinly veiled efforts to punish Muslim 
women for practicing their religion. This sort of color-blind racism 
has long been a harsh reality for ethnic minorities in France.  
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